Corruption of minors, A340 Revised Penal Code

Corruption of minors – refers to the offense of promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of minors to satisfy the lust of another.

1. Concept

Corruption of minors – refers to the offense of promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of minors to satisfy the lust of another.

a. Legal basis

Article 340. Corruption of minors. – Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution or corruption of persons underage to satisfy the lust of another, shall be punished by prision correccional, and if the culprit is a pubic officer or employee, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, he shall also suffer the penalty of temporary absolute disqualification. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 92.)

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2. Modes of commission

The following are the modes of committing the offense:

1) To promote or facilitate the prostitution or corruption of persons underage

2) To commit said acts by a public officer

a. Mode 1: Promotion or Facilitation

Elements of the offense:

1) The offender promotes or facilitates the prostitution or corruption of persons underage; and

2) It is to satisfy the lust of another. (REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 340)

1) Element 1: Promotion or Facilitation

That the offender promotes or facilitates the prostitution or corruption of persons underage is the gravamen of the offense. Promotion or facilitation are different concepts.

Promote – refers to the act of marketing, advertising, or selling.

Facilitation – refers to the act of assisting, aiding, or ensuring that a transaction proceeds or is completed.

a) “Pimping”

In ordinary parlance, this offense is also known as “pimping” where the offender is otherwise referred to as a “pimp”.

2) Element 2: To satisfy the lust of another

The phrase “to satisfy the lust of another” – refers to sexual desires, including sexual intercourse.

Alimagno v. People, G.R. No. L-36458, February 21, 1983, Per Relova, J.:

•The main facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:

Complainant Filomena de la Cruz, who was undisputedly born on August 10, 1946 at Calamba, Laguna (Exh. B), was employed in the house of [P.] Alvero at San Pablo City as a domestic helper for a period of only nine (9) days from November 20, 1964 to November 29, 1964. On November 27, 1964, she came to know defendant [F.] Alimagno who was bringing money to her employer [P.] Alvero. On said date, defendant Alimagno tried to convince her to leave the house of [P.] Alvero, promising her a better job. Defendant Alimagno, having gained her confidence, succeeded in thus persuading her to leave the house of [P.] Alvero. Hence, on November 29, 1964, after leaving a self-explanatory note, Exh. A, which was admittedly written by accused [F.] Alimagno herself, which reads:

Ako ho ay nagtanan kasama ko ay lalake.

Your Utusan

complainant abandoned the house of her mistress and went with defendants [F.] Alimagno and [J.] Melo in a jeep, together with a man and a driver. They then proceeded to Barrio Putol, San Pablo City, where she was brought to a hut thereat and there allowed to be ravished by a man. whom she saw for the first time, after the latter had covered her mouth with a rag and tied her hands, so that she was rendered speechless and helpless from offering any resistance, so much so that he was able to satiate his lust with her until 12:00 o’clock midnight. Thereafter, she was brought by the man to the house of defendant Jovita Melo only to be transferred later to the house of defendant [F.] Alimagno, where she stayed for more or less three days until she was found there and taken back by [L.] Perez and [P.] Alvero. The two thereafter brought her to the Police Department for the corresponding investigation.

• [The Accused] contend that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in convicting them of the crime of corruption of minor upon wholly unsubstantial and inherently conflicting evidence; (2) in not holding that the facts, as found by it and the trial court, do not constitute the crime of corruption of minors as defined and penalized by Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code; (3) in not holding that the minor referred to in Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code should be below 18 years of age; (4) in not holding that a person who is already corrupted can no longer be the victim of corruption of minors committed through abuse of authority or confidence; (5) in not acquitting the [Accused] of the crime of corruption of minors; and, (6) in not holding that the penalty imposed upon petitioner Melo is incorrect.

• [The Accused] argue that they were convicted upon unsubstantial and inherently conflicting evidence. This contention is devoid of factual basis considering the findings of the Court of Appeals which are hereunder reproduced if only to demonstrate that the same were made after a thorough analysis of the evidence, and hence are beyond this Court’s power of review:

Appellants (herein [the Accused]) further contend that the lower court erred in not finding that even before November 29, 1964, the complainant Filomena de la Cruz was already a corrupted person and therefore she could no longer be the victim of the crime of “Corruption of Minors” penalized by Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code in view of the fact that from her own statement, Exh. 1, she admitted that she had sexual intercourse with other men.

This argument is clearly untenable. Complainant, who does not know how to read and write vehemently denied the contents of Exh. 1, saying that it was not the statement she gave to the police. Indeed, she testified that previous to the incident, she did not have any coition with any man and the trial court so believed her. In any event, even assuming it to be true, Article 340 does not prescribe that the persons corrupted be of good reputation, as in the case of simple seduction under Article 338, much less that they be virgins, as in qualified seduction under Article 337, both of the Revised Penal Code. It follows that the above-mentioned traits are of no consequence. …

xxx xxx xxx

With regard to the letter (Exh. A), appellant Francisca Alimagno admitted having written the same out of pity to the complainant Filomena de la Cruz (tsn., p. 70, April 22, 1966). But, if she had nothing to do with complainant’s sexual adventure, it is strange why she wrote said letter, containing false averments, and then took the complainant away from the house of Pita Alvero, without the knowledge and consent of the latter. She, being a friend of Pita Alvero, should have known that her actuation in writing the letter was ill-advised and morally wrong. Her admission that she wrote the same clearly indicates her plan to facilitate or promote the prostitution or corruption of the complainant.

Appellant Francisca Alimagno testified that the witness for the prosecution Leovigildo Perez was demanding P5,000.00 from her and later was reduced to P2,000.00 (tsn. p. 83, April 22, 1966) to quash the case against her. On cross-examination, she (Francisca Alimagno) said that Perez was asking the aforesaid amount on the ground floor of the Secret Service Division. The pertinent portion of her testimony read, thus:

Q You stated that Leovigildo Perez asked P5,000.00 from you, can you tell where Leovigildo Perez asked P5,000.00 from you?

A At the ground floor, sir.

Q Are you referring to the Office of the Secret Service Division?

A At the ground floor but not within the office of the Secret Service Division.

Q Was that when you were called by the Secret Service men?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you immediately denounce Perez to the police what he was asking from you?

A No, sir.

Q Why did you not tell or report the matter to the police?

A Because we called up Atty. Alvero and asked him to assist us.

Q And you told Atty. Alvero that Leovigildo Perez was asking you P5,000.00?

A No, sir, he just told me go home.

Q In other words when Atty. Alvero arrived he just told you to go home?

A Yes. sir. (tsn., pp.100-101, Ibid.)

If there is truth on the matter that Leovigildo Perez was extorting money from her (Francisca Alimagno) for the purpose of quashing the case, appellant Alimagno should have reported or denounced immediately to the police such attitude of Perez, inasmuch as they were near the office of the Secret Service Division or told the matter to Atty. Alvero, but she allegedly kept the matter to herself. The truth, however, is that it was appellant Alimagno who made an offer of P50.00 to Leovigildo Perez to drop the case against her. Thus, the pertinent portion of his (Perez) testimony reads:

A The truth is that the spouses went to our residence and asked me to accept the amount of P50.00 and drop the case. I told them to ask the complainant, but the complainant refused and said that let the court decide the case.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In your answer you refer to the spouses, will you please specify whom you are referring to?

A The spouses, Alimagno, Sir. (tsn., pp. 145-146, June 1, 1966)

The above-quoted testimony of Leovigildo Perez was strengthened by the testimony of Detective Sergeant Francisco Escondo, a disinterested witness for the prosecution who testified, thus:

Q Will you please tell the conversation between you and the accused for the second time?

A They seek our service to help them in settling the case.

Q What was your answer?

A I told them, its up to you. (tsn., pp. 14-15, June 7, 1965.)

On cross-examination, the same witness further testified, thus:

A After Francisca Alimagno had talked with the complainant she requested us to help them to settle this case. t.s.n., p. 22, Ibid.)

It is clear from the foregoing testimony, of both witnesses for the prosecution that the appellants made an offer of compromise for the settlement of the case. These overtures made by the appellants to have the case settled out of court are indicative of a guilty conscience and it is well-settled in this jurisdiction that an offer of compromise is an evidence of guilt…

• We find no reason in this case to depart from the rule which limits this Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review only errors of law “accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence. (Evangelista vs. Abad Santos, 51 SCRA 416.)

b. Mode 2: Public officer

Elements of the offense:

1) The offender is a public officer;

2) The offender promotes or facilitates the prostitution or corruption of persons underage; and

3) It is to satisfy the lust of another. (REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 340)

1) Element 1: Public officer

For this mode, the offender is a public officer. As the law did not qualify what kind of public officer, it is to be understood as any other public officer, regardless of Government office or agency.

2) Element 2: Promotion or Facilitation

See earlier related discussions.

3) Element 3: To satisfy the lust of another

See earlier related discussions.

3. Things to note

The following are some additional things to note about this offense.

a. Common provisions

This offense shares common provisions with other offenses under Title XI of the Revised Penal Code – Crimes Against Chastity. See: Crimes Against Chastity

4. Distinguish from other offenses

This offense is distinguished from other offenses or crimes below.

a. Corruption of minors vs Acts of lasciviousness

In corruption of minors, the offender is promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage (or minors).  Thus, the offended party is specifically identified and limited to minors or persons of underage.

On the other hand, in acts of lasciviousness, the offender commits acts of lasciviousness or lewdness against the offended party without the latter’s consent. The offended party may be any person.

b. Corruption of minors vs Acts of lasciviousness with consent

In corruption of minors, the offender is promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage (or minors).  Thus, the offended party is specifically identified and limited to minors or persons of underage.

On the other hand, in acts of lasciviousness with consent, the offender commits acts of lasciviousness or lewdness against the offended party with the latter’s consent. The offended party may be any person.

c. Corruption of minors vs Simple seduction

In corruption of minors, the offender is promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage (or minors).  Thus, the offended party is specifically identified and limited to minors or persons of underage.

On the other hand, in simple seduction, the offender has sexual intercourse with a 16- or 17-year-old by means of deceit. Thus, the offended party may only be a 16- or 17-year-old.

d. Corruption of minors vs Qualified seduction

In corruption of minors, the offender is promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage (or minors).  Thus, the offended party is specifically identified and limited to minors or persons of underage.

On the other hand, in qualified seduction, the offender has sexual intercourse with a 16- or 17-year-old, by means of abuse of authority. Thus, the offended party may only be a 16- or 17-year-old.

e. Corruption of minors vs White slave trade

In corruption of minors, the offender is promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage (or minors).  Thus, the offended party is specifically identified and limited to minors or persons of underage.

On the other hand, in white slave trade, the offender: (1) engages in the business of prostitution; (2) profits by prostitution; or (3) enlists the service of women for the purpose of prostitution. The offended party is the State, and not the prostitutes or those recruited to be one.

f. Corruption of minors vs Forcible abduction

In corruption of minors, the offender is promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage (or minors).  Thus, the offended party is specifically identified and limited to minors or persons of underage.

On the other hand, in forcible abduction, the offender takes the offended party against her will, and with lewd designs. Thus, the offended party may only be a woman.

g. Corruption of minors vs Consented abduction

In corruption of minors, the offender is promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage (or minors).  Thus, the offended party is specifically identified and limited to minors or persons of underage.

On the other hand, in consented abduction, the offender takes the offended party with her consent, and with lewd designs. Thus, the offended party may only be a woman.

h. Corruption of minors vs Rape

In corruption of minors, the offender is promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage (or minors).  Thus, the offended party is specifically identified and limited to minors or persons of underage.

On the other hand, in rape, the offender has sexual intercourse with offended party without the latter’s consent. The offended party may be any person (excluding minors as it would be statutory rape if they were the offended party).

e. Corruption of minors vs Statutory rape

In corruption of minors, the offender is promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage (or minors).  Thus, the offended party is specifically identified and limited to minors or persons of underage.

On the other hand, in statutory rape, the offender has sexual intercourse with offended party without the latter’s consent. Thus, the offended party may only be a minor.

References

• Title XI – Crimes Against Chastity, Act No. 3815, Revised Penal Code

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/Updated: May 20, 2023