Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, A294-298 Revised Penal Code

Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons is a mode of robbery where violence or intimidation is committed against another person.

1. Concept

Robbery – is an offense committed by “any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything shall be guilty of robbery.” (REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 293)

Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – is a mode of robbery where violence or intimidation is committed against another person.

a. Legal basis

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision I of Article 263 shall have been inflicted.

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.

5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. (As amended by R.A. 7659)

(NB: If the article has been amended by legislation or has been the subject of a Supreme Court decision which may have impacted how it is interpreted, do let us know so we can consider for the next update of this article. You may send it via: Feedback.)

The following table simplifies the various modes of robbery under Article 294.

b. Nomenclatures

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons may be accompanied with other offense, such as homicide, rape, mutilation, arson, and physical injuries.

1) A294(1) Robbery with homicide, rape, mutilation, or arson

Article 294(1) covers the following complex crimes:

1) Robbery with homicide;

2) Robbery with rape;

3) Robbery with mutilation; and

4) Robbery with arson.

For more discussions, see section below on Complex Crimes.

2) A294(2) to A294(5) Robbery with physical injuries

The variance in the assigned nomenclatures may give rise to the false impression that robbery with physical injuries under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code is distinct from robbery with intimidation as well as robbery with violence against persons. The title or heading of Article 294 reads “Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons.” Said heading is clearly the general nomenclature given to all five (5) types of robbery enumerated thereunder. Paragraphs 2 to 5 cover robbery with physical injuries. Paragraph 5, in particular, defines what is known as simple robbery. Simple robbery involves only slight or less serious physical injuries. For conviction under this paragraph, the injury inflicted should not fall within the categories provided for in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294. Thus, over and above the dichotomy of the terms employed, it is certain and beyond dispute that the three accused were tried for the crime under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code. (Ocampo v. People, G.R. No. 163705, July 30, 2007, Per Tinga, J.)

The following case quotes the deliberations for a better understanding.

People v. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020, Per Lazaro-Javier, J.:

• We quote with concurrence the opinion of Justice Mario V. Lopez during the deliberation:

x x x Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is plain and clear. The law only requires the crime of homicide be committed by reason of or on the occasion of robbery. It is not necessary that the person killed must be the victim of the robbery. It can be one of the robbers or an innocent bystander. Neither does it impose that the person who perpetrated the killing must be the same person who committed the robbery. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. Fundamental is the principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.

x x x [D]issecting the paragraphs of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code reveals that the legislature distinguished the treatment of the different accessory crimes. The first part of Article 294 (1) deals with the commission of homicide “by reason or on occasion of the robbery” without any qualification as to who committed the homicide or when the homicide was committed. However, the second part of paragraph [1] involves the commission of robbery “accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.” The use of the words “accompanied by” suggests that for the accessory crimes of rape, mutilation and arson, the robbers themselves must have committed such crimes. On the other hand, the use of the words “by reason or on occasion of the robbery,” evinces that the law merely requires that a homicide was committed by reason or occasion of the robbery. Notably, the difference in phraseology within the same paragraph of the law is crucial. Fundamental is the principle that qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated. The legislature would not have deliberately used different modifying phrases within the same paragraph if it intended similar treatment for the accessory crimes.

Further, in Article 294, paragraph 4, the legislature identified who the perpetrator and the victim must be in the special complex crime of robbery with serious physical injuries. It specified that in the course of the execution of robbery, “the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries” covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263. The law explicitly used the term “offender” evincing that the physical injury must be committed by the same person who is guilty of robbery. Yet, no such import can be found in Article 294, paragraph 1.

x x x [T]he introductory sentence in Article 294 which provides “Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person” must be interpreted merely as a prelude to the enumeration of penalties to be imposed upon persons guilty of robbery. This is because the proper penalties hinge upon the presence or absence of the attending circumstances specified in Article 294, paragraphs 1 to 5, independent of who brought about such circumstances, unless otherwise qualified in the said paragraphs. To interpret that all the circumstances under Article 294 must be committed by the person guilty of the robbery will erase the distinctions among the five paragraphs that were deliberately put in place by the law.

a) A294(5) Simple robbery

[R]obbery defined and penalized under Articles 293 and 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), otherwise known as simple robbery. Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. (Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009, Per Nachua, J.)

c. Qualifying circumstances

Article 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by a band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. – If the offenses mentioned in subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article shall have been committed in an uninhabited place or by a band, or by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering the passenger’s compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of a firearm, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper penalties.

In the same cases, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the leader of the band.

a) Uninhabited place

Uninhabited place – refers to areas where people are not residing.

b) Band

Article 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof. – When more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band…

Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.

Band – refers to at least three (3) armed malefactors. (REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 296)

[I]f the accused who were members of a band could not have prevented the killing committed by their other members, depriving them of the benefit of Article 296, the crime for which they can be convicted is only robbery in band. (People v. Daguman, G.R. No. 219116, August 26, 2020, Per Leonen, J.)

People v. Doble, En Banc, G.R. No. L-30028, May 31, 1982, Per De Castro, J.:

• It is… not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is the criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing. Having been left in the banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code)

• The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient considering the gravity and viciousness of the offense with which they were charged. The evidence, however, fails to establish then complicity by a previous conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed and injured several persons, including peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of the outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not been shown to be as abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.

See related:

c) Use of unlicensed firearm

Article 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof. – When more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in the commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by law, without prejudice of the criminal liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed firearms.

See related:

2. Modes of commission

The following are the modes of committing the offense:

1) Violence or intimidation against persons

NB: There is only one mode of commission, i.e., violence or intimidation against persons. This is not to be confused with other offenses that may come, such as homicide, rape, mutilation, arson, and physical injuries. If other offenses are attendant, then it may result in a higher penalty in view of the principle on complex crimes.

a. Mode 1: Violence or intimidation against persons

Elements of the offense:

1) Intent to gain;

2) Unlawful taking of personal property belonging to another; and

3) Violence against or intimidation of any person. (Eduarte v. People, G.R. No. 176566, April 16, 2009, Per Chico-Nazario, J.)

1) Element 1: Intent to gain

To constitute robbery, the taking should be accompanied by intent to gain. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery, is an internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. (Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, supra.)

Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. (People v. De Jesus, En Banc, G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, Per Curiam)

2) Element 2: Unlawful taking of personal property

The offender unlawfully takes the personal property of another. The item to be taken should be a movable or a personal property; otherwise, a different offense is committed if the item taken is a non-personal property such as house, land, or immovable property.

In robbery, there must be an unlawful taking or apoderamiento, which is defined as the taking of items without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. (Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, supra.)

Eduarte v. People, G.R. No. 176566, April 16, 2009, Per Chico-Nazario, J.:

• Contrary to [the Accused’s] claim, all the above elements of robbery were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. That the bracelet was not found in his possession does negate the existence of animus lucrandi, considering that there exists a substantial interval of time between the actual taking of the bracelet and the subsequent frisking of [the Accused], giving him enough opportunity to dispose of the stolen property. [The Accused] himself narrated in open court that after he was confronted by Navarra and Adoro, the two left. They returned only after 30 minutes together with the policemen, viz:

Q: You mean to say Mr. Witness, that when these two (2) women continuously insisted that you were the thief, you challenged them to call the police, my question is did they call a policeman?

A: When I told them to go to the police station they left and when they returned after thirty (30) minutes they were with a policeman, sir.

• [The Accused] fervently argues that he was not the one who robbed Navarra, but was erroneously accused as the thief. [The Accused] claims the time and the manner of carrying out the crime made it highly improbable for Navarra and Adoro to create in their minds the image of the perpetrator that would enable them to correctly identify him later on. At the moment the snatching took place, it was already dark; and the snatching was swiftly carried out, thereby depriving Navarra and Adoro the opportunity to look at the physical features of the culprit, making their subsequent judgments of the identity of the suspect highly questionable.

• We cannot agree. The most natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being committed. [The Accused]’s assumption that it is harder to look at the features of a stranger’s face when he is closer to you than when he is farther away may hold water only in normal situations. Under emotional stress, however, when the human body’s adrenaline surges, it is highly inconceivable that the mind could not even manage to register the face of the person who threatened bodily harm. As a matter of fact, it is natural, if not instinctive, for the victims to look at the face of the felon. The production of sketches of criminals who were able to flee from authorities is borne out by this human experience.

a) When taking is complete

Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. (Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, supra.)

Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009, Per Nachua, J.:

• As to what was taken, it is undisputed that [the Accused] demanded and eventually received from R&R ₱100,000.00, a personal property belonging to the latter. The amount was placed inside a brown envelope and was given to [the Accused] while inside Max’s Restaurant in EDSA, Caloocan City.

•

• As to how the money was taken, it was proven that ₱100,000.00 was unlawfully taken by the [the Accused] from R&R, with intent to gain and through intimidation… In the instant case, it was adequately proven that [the Accused] received and took possession of the brown envelope containing the money; she even placed her wallet and handkerchief inside the envelope. At that point, there was already “taking.”

• As a public officer employed with the DENR, [the Accused] was tasked to implement forestry laws, rules and regulations. Specifically, she had the power to make reports on forestry violations which could result in the eventual confiscation of logs if the possession thereof could not be justified by the required documents; and the prosecution of violators thereof. Undoubtedly, [the Accused] could not demand and eventually receive any amount from private persons as a consideration for the former’s non-performance of her lawful task. More so, in the instant case where the [the Accused] threatened the complainants with possible confiscation of the logs and prosecution if they would not accede to her demand for ₱100,000.00. Under such circumstances, the eventual receipt of the said amount by the [the Accused] makes the taking “unlawful.”

3) Element 3: Violence or intimidation

The violence or intimidation against persons is the gravamen of the offense. While violence may be fairly straightforward and easy to determine, it is not the same with intimidation as it involves psychological or mental state.

Nuylan v. People, G.R. No. 247286, January 31, 2021, Per Bato, Jr., J.:

• Records show that all of the elements of Robbery are likewise present in this case. While pointing a gun at PFC Fernandez, [the Accused] took the former’s service firearm, ordered him to lie on the ground, and handcuffed him. [The Accused] also took PFC Fernandez’s wallet and money.

a) Violence

Violence may be committed in various ways, such as inflicting physical injuries or brandishing a weapon. Further, the violence contemplated here is something physical as opposed to psychological or mental. If it was psychological, it may be a form of intimidation.

b) Intimidation

Intimidation is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. In robbery with intimidation of persons, the intimidation consists in causing or creating fear in the mind of a person or in bringing in a sense of mental distress in view of a risk or evil that may be impending, real or imagined. Such fear of injury to person or property must continue to operate in the mind of the victim at the time of the delivery of the money. (Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, supra.)

Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009, Per Nachua, J.:

• Applying this principle [on intimidation] to the pertinent facts of the instant case, it is noteworthy that: On September 25, 1992, [the Accused] discovered the questioned logs and asked that the supporting documents be shown; on October 1, she formally demanded the submission of the required documents; on October 7, she demanded payment of a particular sum of money while offering to “fix” the problem; on October 13, she made the final demand; and on October 14, the representatives of R&R parted with their ₱100,000.00. While it appears that initially, [the Accused] only demanded the submission of the supporting documents to show that R&R’s possession of the subject logs was legal, she agreed to talk about the matter outside her office.

• This circumstance alone makes her intentions highly suspect. The same was confirmed when [the Accused] eventually demanded from R&R the payment of a particular sum of money, accompanied by threats of prosecution and confiscation of the logs.

• From the foregoing, and in light of the concept of intimidation as defined in various jurisprudence, we find and so hold that the ₱100,000.00 “grease money” was taken by the [the Accused] from R&R’s representatives through intimidation. By using her position as Senior Management Specialist of the DENR, [the Accused] succeeded in coercing the complainants to choose between two alternatives: to part with their money, or suffer the burden and humiliation of prosecution and confiscation of the logs.

• Indeed, this Court had, in a number of cases involving substantially the same factual milieu as in the present case, convicted the accused of the crime of robbery with intimidation. These include the early cases of People v. Francisco and United States v. Sanchez, and the more recent cases of Fortuna v. People and Pablo v. People.

• In People v. Francisco, the accused, who was then a sanitary inspector in the Philippine Health Service, discovered during an inspection of the merchandise in Sy Ham’s store that the lard was unfit for consumption. He then demanded from Sy Ham the payment of ₱2.00 with threats of prosecution and arrest. For fear of being arrested, prosecuted, and convicted, Sy Ham immediately paid the amount demanded.

• In United States v. Sanchez, two police officers demanded from a Chinese, who allegedly violated the Opium Law, ₱500.00, accompanied by threats to take him before the proper authorities and have him prosecuted. For fear of being sent to prison for a long term, the Chinese paid a negotiated amount of ₱150.00

• In Fortuna v. People and Pablo v. People, three policemen frisked Diosdada and Mario Montecillo, and accused the latter of illegal possession of a deadly weapon. The policemen threatened Mario that he would be brought to the police station where he would be interrogated by the police, mauled by other prisoners and heckled by the press. The apprehending policemen took from Mario ₱1,000.00. They likewise rummaged Diosdada’s bag where they found and eventually pocketed ₱5,000.00. They further demanded from Diosdada any piece of jewelry that could be pawned. Thereafter, the two were released by the policemen.

• In all of the above cases, the Court was convinced that there was sufficient intimidation applied by the accused on the offended parties inasmuch as the acts of the accused engendered fear in the minds of their victims and hindered the free exercise of their will.

3. Things to note

The following are some additional things to note about this offense.

a. Common provisions

This offense shares common provisions with other offenses under Title X of the Revised Penal Code – Crimes Against Property. See: Crimes Against Property

b. Attempted and frustrated robbery

Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. – When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.

c. Forced execution of deeds

Article 298. Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation. – Any person who, with intent to defraud another, by means of violence or intimidation, shall compel him to sign, execute or deliver any public instrument or documents, shall be held guilty of robbery and punished by the penalties respectively prescribed in this Chapter.

d. If both robbery by use of force upon things and robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, are committed

In Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the Court abandoned the doctrine adopted in United States v. De los Santos that when the felonies of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code are committed, the penalty for the latter crime (although the lighter one) should be imposed because the violence against or intimidation of a person was the “controlling qualification,” on the theory that “robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual.” (Frandsilla v. People, G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015, Per Bersamin, J.)

Napolis v. Court of Appeals, No. L-28865, February 28, 1972, Per Concepcion, CJ.:

• Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous decisions, if, aside from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same Code, the imposable penalty – under paragraph (5) thereof – shall be much lighter. To our mind, this result and the process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.

• The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the “controlling qualification,” is far from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with “violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things,” but, precisely, for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited – reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violation or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.

3A. Procedural

The following are some procedural matters.

a. Common provisions

This offense shares common provisions with other offenses under Title IX of the Revised Penal Code – Crimes Against Property.

For more information, see: Crimes Against Property

b. Taken property need not be presented

When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner. (People v. De Jesus, En Banc, supra.)

c. Value need not be proven

The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved. (People v. De Jesus, En Banc, supra.)

4. Distinguish from other offenses

This offense is distinguished from other offenses or crimes below.

a. Robbery with violence or intimidation against persons vs Robbery with force upon things

The main difference is whether the robbery involved violence or intimidation against any person. In robbery with violence or intimidation against any person, such is an element of the offense. On the other hand, in robbery by use of force upon things, there is no violence or intimidation against persons.

People v. Sebastian, En Banc, G.R. No. L-2725, February 27 1950, Per Reyes, J.:

• The appeal raises only a question of law, and we agree with both the Solicitor General and the attorney de oficio that the lower court erred in convicting appellant under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in applying to him the penalty therein provided. Aside from the fact that the information to which appellant pleaded guilty does not allege that the robbery was committed under any of the circumstances enumerated in said article, such as entering the house through an opening not intended for entrance or egress, the breaking of doors, etc., it is now settled that were robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor “supplies the controlling qualification”, so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that “robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence and intimidation against the person is present there is a greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual.”… And this is view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty to be applied under article 294 is lighter than which would result from the application of article 299. (See last case cited.) In accordance with this view, appellant should have been declared guilty of robbery under paragraph 5 of article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No 18, since the charge to which he pleaded guilty alleges robbery through intimidation of persons.

b. Robbery with violence or intimidation against persons vs Theft

The main difference is the violation or intimidation against any person. In robbery with violence or intimidation against any person, such is an element of the offense coupled with the unlawful taking of another’s personal property. On the other hand, in theft, there is no such use of force upon things in the unlawful taking of personal property.

5. Special complex crimes

The following are special complex crimes of the offense.

Related: Special complex crimes

a. Robbery with homicide

The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is punishable under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Daguman, G.R. No. 219116, August 26, 2020, Per Leonen, J.)

Elements of robbery with homicide:

1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

2) The property taken belongs to another;

3) The taking is with the intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and

4) By reason or on occasion of the robbery, homicide is committed.

(People v. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020, Per Lazaro-Javier, J.)

1) Robbery as main purpose

A conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. The killing, however, may occur before, during, or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference to the circumstances, causes, or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration. (People v. Casabuena, supra.)

In the prosecution of robbery with homicide, the State must prove that the offender’s original intent was to commit the crime of robbery. The killing of the victim must only be incidental. Nevertheless, the act of taking the victim’s life may occur before, during, or even after the robbery. So long as the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, the offense committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. (People v. Palema, G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019, Per Leonen, J.)

The word “homicide” is used in its generic sense and includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. As such, the crime is robbery with homicide when the killing was committed to facilitate the taking of the property or escape of the culprit, to preserve the possession of the loot, to prevent the discovery of robbery, or to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. (People v. Juada, G.R. No. 252276, November 11, 2021, Per Lopez, J.)

People v. Juada, G.R. No. 252276, November 11, 2021, Per Lopez, J.:

• All the elements are present in this case. [The Accused], on board a motorcycle and armed with a gun, shot and divested Florante of his personal properties. Evidently, the taking was with intent to gain and was accomplished with violence against person. Thereafter, [the Accused] steered away and fled. Verily, the primary objective of Jerrico was to rob and the killing of the victim was only incidental to facilitate the taking of the property and to prevent apprehension.

2) Intimate connection: robbery and homicide

In robbery with homicide, it is essential that there be a direct relation and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing. It does not matter whether both crimes were committed at the same time. (People v. Casabuena, supra.)

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is plain and clear. The law only requires the crime of homicide be committed by reason of or on the occasion of robbery. It is not necessary that the person killed must be the victim of the robbery. It can be one of the robbers or an innocent bystander. Neither does it impose that the person who perpetrated the killing must be the same person who committed the robbery. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. Fundamental is the principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. (Opinion of Justice Mario V. Lopez during the deliberation, quoted in People v. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020, Per Lazaro-Javier, J.)

3) How and who gets killed, immaterial

It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration. It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. It is also of no moment that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers. (People v. Juada, supra.)

In such scenario [one of the robbers getting killed], the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Verily, once a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. (People v. Casabuena, supra.)

In the following case, it does not matter that one of the perpetrators was killed during the robbery. The surviving perpetrators would be liable for the death and thus be charged with the complex crime of robbery with homicide.

People v. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020, Per Lazaro-Javier, J.:

• [Prosecution’s Version] [The 2 accused, with another who gets killed] boarded and declared a hold-up. One of the hold-uppers was at the entrance of the jeepney and the other was near the driver and was holding a knife. The third hold­ upper took [the belongings of the passengers and gave it] to one of the hold-uppers. After taking the belongings of the passengers, the hold­ uppers alighted from the jeepney. One of the passengers saw a policeman nearby and asked for the latter’s assistance… [Next par.] PO2 [PO2 De Pedro] and [PO2 Albania] were patrolling… in their patrol car when they noticed a commotion inside a jeepney headed to Montalban. PO2 De Pedro saw three (3) male passengers alight the jeepney and heard one of the passengers shout “Holdaper yan, tatlo yan, may baril sila!” Upon seeing the two (2) police officers, one of the three (3) hold­ uppers ran toward Bayan-bayanan Street and was chased by PO2 Albania, while the other two (2) were approached by PO2 De Pedro… [Next par.] PO2 De Pedro introduced himself as a police officer and frisked one of the two (2) hold-uppers. Suddenly, the other hold-upper took a pistol from his backpack, prompting PO2 De Pedro to let go of the M16 rifle he was carrying and wrestle for the possession of the pistol. PO2 De Pedro was able to grab possession of the pistol and fire twice – the second shot hit the hold-upper in the chest, as a result of which, he died. The other hold-upper then threw away the knife he was holding and was subsequently handcuffed by PO2 De Pedro.

• [Defense’s Version] The accused denied the charges.

[Resolution]

• Here, the elements of the complex crime of robbery with homicide are all present:

• First. [The Accused], through force and intimidation, threatening physical violence and death with the use of a gun and knives, took the personal properties of the passengers of the jeepney.

• Second. The properties found in the person of [the Accused]did not belong to them but to the passengers of the jeepney.

• Third. The intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. [The Accused] were caught in the possession of various small items that belonged to the passengers of the jeepney.

• Fourth. A person died, i.e., Arizala, on the occasion of the robbery.

• [I]t is irrelevant if the victim of homicide is one of the robbers. In such scenario, the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Verily, once a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide.

• Here, as clearly testified by PO2 De Pedro, he was on mobile patrol and tailing the jeepney that was being held-up by appellants and Arizala. He personally witnessed them alight from the jeepney. Hence, he immediately accosted them. Then, Arizala pulled out his gun. PO2 De Pedro grappled with Arizala for possession of the gun. In the process, Arizala got shot and died. Applying Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and People v. Ebet and People v. De Jesus, [the accused] as two (2) of the robbers are guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide.

5) Homicide

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed to:

1) Facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit;

2) To preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;

3) To prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or,

4) To eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. (People v. De Jesus, supra.)

a) Killing in a place other than situs of robbery

As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery. (Ibid.)

4) Treachery

In robbery with homicide, the presence of treachery in killing the victim is considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in fixing the proper penalty and civil liability of the accused. (People v. Juada, supra.)

People v. Escote, Jr., En Banc, G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003, Per Callejo, Sr., J.:

• Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.

• In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of “homicide” and not to the constituent crime of “robbery” of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

• The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.

5) Conspiracy

All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized. (People v. De Jesus, supra.)

6) All are principals

Significantly, when homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing. (People v. Casabuena, supra.)

If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, however, he is guilty only of robbery. (People v. Casabuena, supra.)

People v. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020, Per Lazaro-Javier, J.:

• Here, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that conspiracy exists between appellants and Arizala [the deceased] based on [C.V.] Abella’s testimony that they were the persons who helped each other in robbing her and the other passengers of the jeepney. She testified that they boarded the jeepney and declared a hold-up. One of them was at the entrance of the jeepney, while the other was near the driver and holding a knife. The third hold-upper took the belongings of the passengers of the jeepney, including her own. After taking their belongings, the hold-uppers alighted from the jeepney.

• These acts of appellants and Arizala [the deceased] clearly show a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Notably, in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

For more information, see: Conspiracy

7) Prevention of homicide

If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. (People v. De Jesus, supra.)

8) No robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence

There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated. (People v. De Jesus, En Banc, G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, Per Curiam)

9) No robbery with homicide in band

[W]ith the present wording of art. 295 there is no crime as “robbery with homicide in band.” If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as “robbery with homicide” under art. 294(1), but the element of band, as stated above, would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance. (People v. Apduhan, Jr., En Banc, G.R. No. L-19491, August 30, 1968)

b. Robbery with rape

Elements of the special complex crime of Robbery with Rape are as follows:

1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

2) The property taken belongs to another;

3) The taking is done with animus lucrandi; and

4) The robbery is accompanied by rape. (People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 234943, January 19, 2021, Per Carandang, J.)

The crime of Robbery with Rape is penalized under Article 294 of the · Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7659. Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. It contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. (People v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017, Per Tijam, J.)

1) Rape as accompanying act only

In robbery with rape, the true intent of the accused must be to take, with intent to gain, the property of another; rape must be committed only as an accompanying crime. Article 294 does not distinguish when rape must be committed, for as long as it is contemporaneous with the commission of robbery. (People v. Barrera, En Banc, G.R. No. 230549, December 01, 2020)

For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. (People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 137586, July 30, 2002, Per Ynares-Santiago, J.)

People v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017, Per Tijam, J.:

• The prosecution’s evidence established with certainty that accused-appellant, together with his brother Marvin, and co-accused Noel, have intruded the house of spouses Teodora and Robert on the occasion of Hiroshi’s birthday celebration thereat. They aided each other in divesting the guests of Hiroshi of their personal belongings through violence and intimidation. The evidence disclosed that they were armed with guns and knife, and they tied the hands of their victims and threatened them with harm if they disobeyed their orders. Noel and Marvin, on the same occasion, entered the room of spouses Teodora and Robert through the window and succeeded in taking away from their possession some pieces of jewelry, laptop, ATM card, and cash.

• The evidence further show that, on the occasion of the robbery, AAA · was raped. The RTC and the CA are correct in their appreciation that the original intent of the accused-appellant and his cohorts was to take, with intent to gain, the personal effects of their victims. Rape was committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. Accused-appellant was implicated because he was positively identified as Noel’s companion inside the room where AAA and Rhea were soundly sleeping.

• While the evidence directly points to Noel as AAA’s rapist, accused-appellant did not prevent him from committing the lustful act despite an opportunity to do so.

• As stated above, once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, as in the present case, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape.

Related: Rape

2) Multiple rapes merged into one

All the rapes are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with rape, so long as the rapes accompanied the robbery. (People v. Seguis, G.R. No. 135034, January 18, 2001, Per Puno, J.)

People v. Seguis, G.R. No. 135034, January 18, 2001, Per Puno, J.:

• It is to be noted that the accused in this case were originally indicted for the felony of robbery with multiple rape, a special complex crime punishable under Art. 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code and which is committed when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape. The said provision, needless to say, covers cases of multiple rapes. This is primarily due to the fact that the juridical concept of this crime does not limit the consummation of rape against one single victim or to one single act, making other rapes in excess of that number as separate, independent offense or offenses. All the rapes are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with rape, so long as the rapes accompanied the robbery. It does not matter too whether the rape occurred before, during, or after the robbery.

• Still and all, this does not change the nature of the felony. It is essentially a crime against property… To sustain a conviction, it is imperative that the robbery itself must be conclusively established; just as the fact that it was the accused who committed it be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must be able to demonstrate the level of their participation with legal and moral certainty, including the existence of a conspiracy, if any. Otherwise, those who were charged should be acquitted, at least for the robbery. Proof of the rape alone is not sufficient to support a conviction for the crime of robbery with rape.

3) No participation in rape

{T]he long line of jurisprudence on the special complex crime of Robbery with Rape requires that the accused be aware of the sexual act in order for him to have the opportunity to attempt to prevent the same, without which he cannot be faulted for his inaction. Further, there must be positive proof to show such awareness. (People v. Agaton, G.R. No. 251631, August 27, 2020, Per Peralta, J.)

People v. Agaton, G.R. No. 251631, August 27, 2020, Per Peralta, J.:

• Although we made a pronouncement in Evangelio that there was no showing that the other accused, including herein appellant, prevented Joseph from sexually abusing AAA, the record is bereft of any positive proof that he was aware of the act. The fact that he was upstairs while the rape was occurring lends even more credence to the absence of awareness.

• The accused who is aware of the lustful intent or sexual act of his co-­accused but did not endeavor to prevent or stop it, despite an opportunity to do so, becomes complicit in the rape and is perfectly liable for Robbery with Rape. On the other hand, for an accused who is totally ignorant of the same and who did not merely choose to turn a blind eye, it could not have been the intent of the law to punish him as severely as those who committed the sexual act or who were aware thereof but were indifferent to its commission. He shall, therefore, be held liable only for Robbery, as in the case at bench.

• For lack of positive proof that he was aware of the rape, appellant shall only be liable for robbery under paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code…

a) When liable

In United States v. Tiongco, … the conviction of two robbers [was affirmed] for Robbery with Rape even if they took no part in the rape because they made no opposition nor prevented their co-accused from consummating the rape. (People v. Agaton, supra., citing United States v. Tiongco, G.R. No. L-12270, March 26, 1918)

In People v. Merino, … the accused [was found] to be equally liable for the rape because he was aware of the dastardly act being performed by his co-accused but merely told the latter to hurry. (People v. Agaton, supra., citing People v Merino, G.R. No. 132329, December 17, 1999)

b) When not liable

In People v. Canturia, … some of the robbers [were not] liable for the rape because while the evidence convincingly shows a conspiracy to commit only robbery among the accused, there is no evidence that the other members of the band were aware of the lustful intent of the perpetrator of the rape and his consummation thereof so that they could have attempted to prevent the same. To be equally responsible for the rape, there should be positive proof that they abetted or, at least, were aware of the rape. (People v. Agaton, supra., citing People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 108490, June 22, 1995)

In People v. Anticamara, et al., echoing our ruling in Canturia, we ruled that there was no evidence to prove that the accused was aware of the rape and, therefore, could have prevented the same. Thus, we found the accused guilty of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention instead of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. (People v. Agaton, supra., citing People v. Anticamara, 666 Phil. 484 (2011))

In People v. Villaruel,41 we found that there is neither allegation nor evidence that the other co-accused also raped the victim or assisted the perpetrators in committing the rape. Consequently, they cannot be held guilty of robbery with rape, but only of robbery. (People v. Agaton, supra., citing People v. Villaruel, 330 Phil. 79 (1996))

In People v. Mendoza,42 we held that for the accused to be convicted only of the crime of robbery, he must prove not only that he himself did not abuse the victim but that he tried to prevent the rape. The accused cannot seek refuge in our ruling in Canturia when the evidence shows that he was indeed aware. (People v. Agaton, supra., citing People v. Mendoza, 354 Phil. 177 (1998))

In People v. Belmonte,43 we ruled that the act of endeavoring to prevent the commission of the lustful act presupposes that there was an opportunity to do so. Hence, where the accused did not prevent the commission thereof despite an opportunity to do so, he is equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on occasion of the robbery. (People v. Agaton, supra., citing People v. Belmonte, 813 Phil. 240 (2017))

4) No robbery proven, only rape

In a criminal action for robbery with rape, where the prosecution failed to prove the robo or the participation of the accused in it, the latter may still be convicted for the rape. (People v. Seguis, supra.)

5) No robbery but theft, and rape

If no robbery is proven but only theft, then there are two separate offenses: theft and rape.

People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 137586, July 30, 2002, Per Ynares-Santiago, J.:

• As for the taking of complainant’s money, we are likewise convinced that accused-appellant unlawfully took the P500.00. His oral confession before the barangay officer that he took only P400.00 from complainant was properly taken into consideration by the trial court, considering that the same was not given during police custodial investigation and, thus, need not have been made with the assistance of counsel. Records also reveal that aside from being corroborated by complainant, the testimony of the barangay officer in this regard was not objected to by accused-appellant in the court below.

• However, we are unable to agree with the trial court that the felony committed by accused-appellant is the complex crime of robbery with rape.

• Consequently, Accused-appellant should be held to account for two separate felonies. The taking of complainant’s money appears to be only incidental to the rape and was indeed, more of an afterthought. It can even be said that the illegal taking was accidental because accused-appellant could not have known beforehand that complainant had P500.00 in her pocket. The money was apparently discovered only after complainant was made to remove her clothes and accused-appellant decided to steal the sum when the circumstances proved to be convenient.

• Nevertheless, even as we agree with the OSG that accused-appellant committed two distinct crimes, we differ with its conclusion that the unlawful taking in this case constitutes robbery, as defined in Article 293 21 of the Revised Penal Code. The act of taking in robbery is by means of violence or intimidation which must be shown to have clearly attended its commission. In the case at bar, complainant’s money was surreptitiously taken by accused-appellant after consummating the rape, such that the intimidation or force employed in the perpetration of the rape appears to have had no bearing on the illegal taking of the P500.00. We thus hold that in accordance with the evidence presented, the other crime committed is simple theft.

• Accused-appellant may be convicted of the separate crimes of rape and theft despite the fact that the offense charged in the information is only robbery with rape. As worded, the information sufficiently alleged all the elements of both felonies…

c. Robbery with intentional mutilation

Elements of the special complex crime of Robbery with Intentional Mutilation:

1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

2) The property taken belongs to another;

3) The taking is done with animus lucrandi; and

4) The robbery is accompanied by mutilation. (REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 294[1]).

[M]utilation (mutilacion) is understood, according to the Diccionario de la lengua, the lopping or clipping off (cercenamiento) of some part of the body, and it is evident that the putting out of an eye does not fall under this definition. (The United States v. Bogel, En Banc, G.R. No. 2957, January 3, 1907, Per Carson, J.)

The United States v. Bogel, En Banc, G.R. No. 2957, January 3, 1907, Per Carson, J.:

• The guilt of the accused of the crime of robbery with which they were charged was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It was further proven that one of the accused, on the occasion of the robbery, stabbed a woman named Fabiana in one eye, and that as a result of the wound thus inflicted she lost the use of the eye.

• [On the issue of whether a higher penalty should be imposed on the ground that the loss of the eye was argued to be a form of mutilation, it was held that it was not based on the definition of mutilation, see above.] … the putting out of an eye does not fall under [the definition of mutilation].

Related: Mutilation

d. Robbery with arson

Elements of the special complex crime of Robbery with Intentional Mutilation:

1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

2) The property taken belongs to another;

3) The taking is done with animus lucrandi; and

4) The robbery is accompanied by arson. (REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 294[1]).

Related: Arson

1) No robbery, only arson

Robbery has to be proven to commit the special complex crime of Robbery with Arson. If robbery is not proven, then the offense may only be arson.

People v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 70222, February 27, 1987, Per Cruz, J.:

• We agree that there was a conspiracy among the accused-appellant and his two companions when they forcibly entered the house of Teresa Gorospe and burned it after their demand for P1,000.00 was not met.

• It has been amply demonstrated that in the evening of August 25, 1980, at about 11 o’clock, Ancheta and his two companions awakened Teresa Gorospe, forced their entry into her house, demanded the amount of P1,000.00, and burned her house when the money was not delivered. Later, while the house was in flames, the accused-appellant, brandishing a bolo, prevented the people from approaching and putting out the fire by warning them that he had thirty companions. The three men who sought to rob and then burned the house were obviously acting in concert in accordance with a preconceived design which they ultimately carried out.

• The conspiracy having been established, it should follow that the accused-appellant is as guilty as his companions of the crime of arson, even if it be conceded that he was not the one who actually poured the kerosene and ignited it to burn Teresa Gorospe’s house. When there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and visits equal guilt upon every conspirator.

• The charge of robbery was correctly rejected because it was not proved by any of the prosecution witnesses. Nobody testified that he actually saw any of the three intruders take anything from the house, and no article taken from the house that was burned was found in the possession of Ancheta or his co-accused. The policemen who recovered the things alleged in the information to have been stolen were not presented at the trial to testify on where or from whom they were recovered.

Related: Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony, A8 Revised Penal Code

References

⦁ Title 10 – Crimes Against Property, Book 2, Revised Penal Code