Theft, A308-309, 311 Revised Penal Code

Theft – is the offense of taking another’s personal property without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things.

1. Concept

Theft – is [an offense] committed if the taking [of another’s personal property] is without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things. (Tan v. People, G.R. No. 134298, August 26, 1999)

a. Legal basis

Article 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million two hundred thousand pesos (P2,200,000); but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one (1) year for each additional One million pesos (P1,000,000), but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than Six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).

3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) but does not exceed Six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000).

4. Arresto menor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over Five thousand pesos (P5,000) but does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000).

5. Arresto menor to its full extent, if such value is over Five hundred pesos (P500) but does not exceed Five thousand pesos (P5,000).

6. Arresto menor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed Five hundred pesos (P500).

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed Five hundred pesos (P500). If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000), when the value of the thing stolen is not over Five hundred pesos (P500), and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family. (As amended by R.A. 10951)

Art. 311. Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum.— If the property stolen be any property of the National Museum, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) to One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000), or both, unless a higher penalty should be provided under other provisions of this Code, in which case, the offender shall be punished by such higher penalty. (As amended by R.A. 10951)

(Revised Penal Code)

2. Modes of commission

The following are the modes of committing the offense:

1) Taking of another’s personal property with intent to gain and without the use of violence, intimidation, or force upon persons or things;

2) Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;

3)  Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

5) Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

a. Mode 1: Taking of another’s personal property

Elements of the crime of theft:

1) The actual act of taking without the use of violence, intimidation, or force upon persons or things;

2) Intent to gain on the part of the taker; and

3) The absence of the owner’s consent. (People v. Mejares, G.R. No. 225735, January 10, 2018, Per Leonen, J.)

NB: There are older jurisprudence which provides for five (5) elements for the crime of theft, i.e.: (1)  There must be a taking; (2) The property belongs to another; (3) The taking was done with intent to gain; (4) That it was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) That it was accomplished without violence or intimidation of persons nor force upon things (Abundo v. Samdiganbayan, Em Banc, G.R. No. 97880, January 15, 1992, Per Griño-Aquino, J. citing Santos vs. People, 181 SCRA 487). Recent decisions have narrowed the elements to three (3) as shown in People v. Mejares.

1) Element 1: Actual act of taking without the use of violence, intimidation, or force upon persons or things

The actual taking without the use of violence, intimidation, or force upon persons of things is an element of the offense and thus should be duly proven.

Realiza v. People, G.R. No. 228745, August 26, 2020, Per Gaerlan, J.:

• In the present case, all the elements of the crime of theft were successfully established by the prosecution. As found by the trial courts and upheld by the CA, petitioner took the rubber boots, frying pan and iron pot owned by Elfa without the latter’s consent or permission. [The Accused] retained the items which shows his intention to gain. It was also established that he entered the house of Elfa without violence, intimidation or force upon things.

People v. Molde, G.R. No. 228262, January 21, 2019, Per Del Castillo, J.:

• The prosecution failed to prove the crucial elements of taking of personal property and intent to gain on the part of appellant.

• For one thing, the subject checks were issued payable to Sun Pride; hence, appellant could not have possibly presented said checks to the drawee bank for encashment for his own personal gain. This fact was confirmed by Sun Pride’s own internal auditor.

• For another, it appears that appellant, too, could not have taken the cash collections of Sun Pride’s sales agents for his own personal gain, considering that what he actually received from said sales agents were only deposit slips of the cash payments, personally deposited by the sales agents themselves with the bank.

• Notably, the prosecution never denied that the company policy mandated its sales agents to personally deposit their cash collections to the bank. It simply argued that the policy was suddenly changed for the months of November and December [2009] and January [2010] to accommodate the high sales during said period. The documentary evidence, however, negates this assertion completely.

• To illustrate, the WRTR of Sonia Tigson (Tigson) dated December 13, 2009 showed that ₱47,467.80 worth of cash collections for the period December 7 to 12, 2009 had been deposited by Tigson herself to Sun Pride’s bank account. Another WRTR dated December 13, 2009 similarly showed that cash collections for the same period in the sum of ₱95,850.37 was also deposited by Tigson to said bank account.

• Significantly, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that appellant had actually received the check and cash collections from the company’s sales agents. The supposed acknowledgment receipts proving that appellant actually received cash’ and check remittances from Sun Pride’s sales agents had mysteriously gone missing and could not be located in any of the company’s offices.

• The totality of these circumstances leads us to inevitably conclude that the elements of taking of personal property with intent to gain were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Absent any concrete proof that appellant indeed received: (a) cash collections of Sun Pride’s sales agents; and/or (b) checks payable to cash or in appellant’s name, he cannot be adjudged to have taken the same for his own personal gain.

2) Element 2: Intent to gain

That the offender has intent to gain is a specific element and thus should be proven. This is to rule out any other form of taking without intent to gain, such as intentionally or accidentally removing or relocating another’s property from one place to another. For instance, if a person incorrectly leaves their umbrella in a place not designated as deposit area for such items and thus another person such as a security guard takes such property to place it to the correct area, there is no intent to gain in such taking and thus would not constitute theft.

a. Return of stolen property, immaterial

[W]hen one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latter’s consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain. (People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 08, 2004, Per Carpio-Morales, J.)

Villacorta v. Insurance Commission, G.R. No. L-54171, October 28, 1980, Per Teehankee, Acting C.J. (later Chief Justice):

• Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was “temporary” and for a “joy ride”, the Court sustains as the better view that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it “hurt de uso.”

3) Element 3: Absence of the owner’s consent

As the absence of the owner’s consent is an element of the crime of theft, then it is logical to state that there can be no theft if the owner consented in the taking of the personal property.

Abundo v. Samdiganbayan, Em Banc, G.R. No. 97880, January 15, 1992, Per Griño-Aquino, J.:

• In this case, the element of lack of the owner’s consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent, for the records show that [the Accused], as District Engineer of the DPWH at Virac, Catanduanes, made a request in writing, duly addressed to the Area Equipment Services Office, to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among the pile of junk motor vehicles lying idle in the Capitol compound. His request was granted by Equipment Engineer Marcelo R. Alberto, the Motor Pool Officer. A memorandum receipt was issued and signed by [the Accused] and Engineer Alberto. Pursuant thereto, Romeo Go, the Supply Officer and Property Custodian of the Catanduanes Area Equipment Services, authorized [the Accused]’s driver, Geronimo Romero, to take the chassis out of the DPWH site in the Capitol Compound. [The Accused]’s driver proceeded to the site and upon presentation of his authority to the driver-mechanic and his helpers, the subject chassis was dismantled by the mechanic and his helpers and [the Accused]’s engine was mounted on it. [The Accused]’s driver thereafter drove the chassis, equipped with [the Accused]’s engine, out of the compound.

• The facts clearly show that there was no furtive taking or unlawful asportation, in the criminal sense, of the chassis. The physical and juridical possession of the subject chassis was transferred to [the Accused], at his request, with the consent of the Motor Pool Officer, Engineer Alberto. The delivery of the chassis to [the Accused] was properly documented. The transfer or “turn over” (p. 9, Solicitor General’s Manifestation) was subject to the condition, stated in the Memorandum Receipt, that:

The recipient official promises to negotiate with the winning highest bidder for the junk property after the public auction or return same in case of failure to agree on cost…

• [The Accused] took the junk chassis with the consent or acquiescence of the public officials who had legal and physical possession of it. The consent of the owner, the Government, represented by the Property Custodian, Romeo M. Go, and the Motor Pool Officer, Marcelo R. Alberto, was not lacking.

It is universally recognized that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession, and this doctrine is well accepted in both the common-law and civil law jurisdictions. It follows therefore, that there cannot be theft when the owner has voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing (Emphasis ours; People vs. Aw Yong Chiow Soo, 43 Phil. 942, 945)

• As observed by the Solicitor-General:

It must be emphasized that both petitioner and Alberto thought and believed the latter to be clothed with the authority to lend out the subject chassis. It was upon this honest perception that both acted accordingly — on the part of [the Accused] by requesting in writing for the use of the junk chassis and on the part of Alberto by consenting thereto, finally culminating in the issuance of a Memorandum Receipt. Needless to state, a thief does not ask for permission to steal… (p. 174, Rollo)

• A felonious taking characterizes the crime of theft. A taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious (p. 192, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., Aquino, citing the cases of Nieves de Vera, 43 Phil. 1000, 1007; Isaac 51 O.G. 2410). Lack of malice or criminal intent on the part of petitioner was sufficiently established in this case.

• Since the prosecution failed to prove that theft was committed by Abundo, it is unnecessary to discuss whether the theft was simple or qualified.

a) Knowledge of who is the owner of the thing stolen

Pua Yi Kun v. People, En Banc, G.R. No. L-26256, June 26, 1968, Per Reyes, J.B.L., J.:

• We are aware that some decisions state that the crime of theft does not require that the culprit should know the owner of the thing stolen. Other authorities declare that it is not necessary for the existence of the crime of theft that it should appear in a specific manner who is the owner of the thing stolen, and that the crime is consummated provided the thing belongs to another and the same is taken with intent of gain (Decision, Supreme Court of Spain, Nov. 22, 1898 and October 4, 1905).

• By and large, these pronouncements are merely generalizations designed to cover all varieties of theft, from the one where the thing stolen is taken directly from the owner’s control to that committed by “any person who having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner” which is also theft under Article 308, paragraph 2(1), Revised Penal Code. The rulings, therefore, are not fully applicable to the present case, which does not involve property lost (extraviada) nor do they warrant the inference that the non-consent of the owner or possessor can be excused.

• In the ordinary course of events, the owner of the thing (whoever he should be) would not consent to the taking of his property without any consideration or quid pro quo therefor; nevertheless, the possibility of such consent remains and the law demands that it be negated in the information. That the owner’s lack of consent can not be dispensed with in charging an ordinary theft under the first paragraph of Article 308 of the Penal Code, is shown by the express requirement therein that the taking should be without the consent of the owner.3 In view of the clear text of the law, an information or charge that does not aver this lack of consent is manifestly bad and insufficient, and may be quashed for failure to allege an essential element of the delict.

b. Mode 2: Failing to deliver lost property to the local authorities or to its owner

Elements of the crime of theft via failing to deliver lost property to the local authorities or to its owner:

1) That a property has been lost;

2) That the offender found said lost property; and

3) That the offender fails to deliver the lost property to the local authorities or to its owner. (REVISED PENAL CODE, Paragraph 2, Article 308)

Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed. (Valenzuela v. People, En Banc, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, Per Tinga, J.)

c. Mode 3: Removal or making use of the fruits or object of the maliciously damaged property of another caused by him

Elements of the crime of theft via removal or making use of the fruits or object of the maliciously damaged property of another caused by him:

1) That the offender maliciously damaged the property of another; and

2) That the offender removes or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him. (REVISED PENAL CODE, Paragraph 2, Article 308)

d. Mode 4: Hunting or fishing, or gathering cereals, or other forest or farm products, after unlawfully trespassing an inclosed estate or a field upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

5) Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

Elements of the crime of theft via hunting or fishing, or gathering cereals or other farm products after unlawful trespassing:

1) That there is an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another;

2) That the offender enters said inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden;

3) That the offender did so without the consent of the owner; and

4) That the offender hunts or fishes upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products. (REVISED PENAL CODE, Paragraph 2, Article 308)

3. Things to note

The following are some additional things to note about this offense.

a. Common provisions

This offense shares common provisions with other offenses under Title X of the Revised Penal Code – Crimes Against Property. See: Crimes Against Property

b. History of animo lucrandi

In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of theft, which under early Roman law as defined by Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass “any kind of physical handling of property belonging to another against the will of the owner,” a definition similar to that by Paulus that a thief “handles (touches, moves) the property of another.” However, with the Institutes of Justinian, the idea had taken hold that more than mere physical handling, there must further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus: “[f]urtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve.” This requirement of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was maintained in both the Spanish and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since been abandoned in Great Britain. (Valenzuela v. People, En Banc, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, Per Tinga, J.)

In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or “unlawful taking,” to characterize theft. Justice Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once had a controversial interpretation and application. Spanish law had already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with “the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.” However, a conflicting line of cases decided by the Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be permanency in the taking or an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property; or that there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento. Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter thought that there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking. (Ibid.)

c. Corpus delicti

Corpus delicti, in its legal sense, refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In the crime of theft, corpus delicti has two elements: 1) that personal property is lost by its owner, and 2) that it was lost through felonious taking. (Imperial v. People, G.R. No. 230519, June 30, 2021, Per Gaerlan, J.)

d. Public crime

Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. (Tan v. People, G.R. No. 134298, August 26, 1999, Per Pardo, J.)

e. Requires a victim

Tan v. People, G.R. No. 134298, August 26, 1999, Per Pardo, J.:

• Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, crime of robbery or theft has been committed.

• In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.

3A. Procedural

The following are some procedural matters.

a. No frustrated theft, only attempted or consummated

The 2007 case of Valenzuela v. People finally resolved the question on whether there was frustrated theft as it was the main issue raised on appeal by the accused.

Valenzuela v. People, En Banc, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, Per Tinga, J.:

• For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that “[i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated.”91

• It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of “taking” itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the “taking not having been accomplished.” Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.

• With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

• Neither Diño nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained possession over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of property. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.

• Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule —that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property frustrates the theft — would introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect any legislated intent,95 since the Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. It is difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the psychological belief of the offender at the time of the commission of the crime, as implied in Diño?

• Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size and weight of the property, the location of the property, the number and identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the number and identity of people whom the offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the manner in which the stolen item had been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more. Even the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into account, relevant as that would be on whether such property is capable of free disposal at any stage, even after the taking has been consummated.

• All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was indeed deprived of property by one who intended to produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will remain the presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution, including the taking, have been completed. If the facts establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been performed. But once all these acts have been executed, the taking has been completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the consummation of the theft.

• We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft.

4. Distinguish from other offenses

This offense is distinguished from other offenses or crimes below.

a. Theft vs Qualified theft

The main difference between the two is on: grave abuse of confidence. In theft, there is an unlawful taking of another’s personal property with intent to gain and without violence against or intimidation of any person nor force upon things. On the other hand, in qualified theft, it has the same elements as theft, and in addition thereto, theft was done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e. with grave abuse of confidence.

More info: Qualified theft

b. Theft vs Fencing

The main difference between the two is that theft is a precursor to the offence of fencing. In theft, there is an unlawful taking of another’s personal property with intent to gain and without violence against or intimidation of any person nor force upon things. On the other hand, in fencing, the offender essentially, inter alia, deals in any other manner with objects or anything of value which he knows, or should have known to him, to have been proceeds from the crime of robbery or theft, and he does so with intent to gain for himself or for another.

Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. (Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 249196, April 28, 2021, Per Zalameda, J.)

Elements of the crime of fencing:

1) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2) The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

3) The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4) There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. (Dizon-Pamintuan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994, Per Davide, Jr., J.)

More info: Fencing

c. Theft vs Carnapping

[W]hile the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively. (People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 08, 2004, Per Carpio-Morales, J.)

More info: Carnapping

4A. In relation to other offenses

N/A

5. Complex crime

N/A

References

⦁ Title 10 – Crimes Against Property, Book 2, Revised Penal Code

/Updated: August 21, 2023