Chapter 2. Prescription of Ownership and Other Real Rights (Title V, Book III, Civil Code)
Article 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. (1940a)
A. Notes
1) Definitions.
a. Prescription – in the context of ownership and possession, “is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.” (Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007)
b. Acquisitive prescription – in the context of ownership and possession, refers to “the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in paragraph 1, Article 1106”; also known as “adverse possession” and “usucapcion.” (Pangasinan v. Disongloalmazora, G.R. No. 200558, July 1, 2015)
c. Extinctive prescription – in the context of ownership and possession, refers to a state “whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in paragraph 2, Article 1106 and Article 1139”; also known as “litigation of action”. (Ibid.)
d. Good faith – “good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.” (Civil Code, Article 1127)
e. Just title – “[f]or the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.” (Ibid., Article 1129)
2) The 2 kinds of acquisitive prescription. The following are the two kinds of prescriptions:
(a) Ordinary acquisitive prescription; and
(b) Extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
3) Ordinary acquisitive prescription. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law; without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character. (Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, supra.)
“Regarding real or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive prescription requires a period of possession of ten years.” (Ibid.)
a. Same; Requisites. The following are the requisites for ordinary acquisitive prescription:
(1) Possession of things in good faith and with just title; and
(2) For the time fixed by law. (Civil Code, Article 1117)
b. Same; Same; Possession. The possession contemplated herein must be “in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted”. (Ibid., Article 118)
c. Same; Same; Good faith.
d. Same; Same; Just title. The phrase “just title” as used herein is defined in Article 1129.
e. Same; Same; Time fixed by law.
4) Extraordinary acquisitive prescription. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith. (Mercado v. Espinocilla, G.R. No. 184109, February 1, 2012)
For real or immovable property, “extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years.” (Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, supra.)
Mercado v. Espinocilla, supra.
• Here, petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents’ possession with his assertion that Macario’s fraudulent acquisition of Dionisia’s share created a constructive trust. In a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary (Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel). The relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive trust is for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse. Prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship.
• Then, too, respondents’ uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552 was established. Macario occupied Dionisia’s share in 1945 although his claim that Dionisia donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit. We also agree with the CA that Macario’s possession of Dionisia’s share was public and adverse since his other co-owners, his three other sisters, also occupied portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale made by Macario and his two daughters in favor of his son Roger confirms the adverse nature of Macario’s possession because said sale of 225 sq. m. was an act of ownership over Macario’s original share and Dionisia’s share. In 1985, Roger also exercised an act of ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It was only in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer petitioner’s complaint, that respondents’ peaceful possession of the remaining portion (109 sq. m.) was interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found Macario’s 1948 affidavit void is of no moment. Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned with Macario’s title or good faith. Accordingly, the RTC erred in ruling that Macario cannot acquire by prescription the shares of Salvacion, Aspren, and Isabel, in Dionisia’s 114-sq. m. share from Lot No. 552.
Article 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. (1941)
Notes:
1) Definitions.
a. Possession in the concept of an owner – refers to “a person’s belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying.” (Republic v. Roasa, G.R. No. 176022, February 2, 2015)
2) Concept of an owner. The article requires that the possession in the concept of an owner should be “public, peaceful and uninterrupted.”
a. Same; Public or open. “Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine.” (Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, supra.)
To be public, possession must be open and known to other individuals other than the claimant-possessor, particularly to persons within the community where the property is located.
b. Same; Peaceful. To be peaceful, possession must not be the subject of any dispute or controversy, such as legal action or litigation, or disturbance via protests.
c. Same; Uninterrupted. “It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.” (Ibid.)
To be uninterrupted, possession must have been continuous, i.e., claimants-possessors have not been disturbed during their history of the possession by another person who may have taken over or possessed the property, whether unlawfully through force or legal process such as a court order (e.g., injunction). (See Civil Code, Article 1120)
d. Same; Not related to declaration that land is alienable or disposable. “It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land. His or her rights, however, are still to be determined under the law.” (AFP-RSBS v. Republic, G.R. No. 180086, July 2, 2014)
e. Same; Conclusion of law. The concept of an owner is “a conclusion of law to be determined by courts.” (Republic v. Roasa, G.R. No. 176022, February 2, 2015)
Article 1119. Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession. (1942)
Notes:
1) Definitions.
a. In virtue of license – in the context of possession, refers to acquiring possession as a result of permission or grant, e.g., lease contract granting a lessee the right to possess the leased property.
b. By mere tolerance – in the context of possession, refers to the act of extending patience by the property to the possessor of the owner’s property without the express permission of the owner, e.g., homeless individual temporarily using the property owned by the property owner who exercises patience over the situation.
2) Possession due to license or tolerance. For purposes of prescription, possession resulting from license or mere tolerance will not be available to the claimants.
a. Same; Rationale. Such kinds of possession are not available because prescription requires that possession must be “in the concept of an owner.” (See Civil Code, Article 1118)
b. Same; Same; In virtue of license. In addition, for possession resulting in virtue of a license, possessors from the beginning acknowledged that their possession is via permission or grant from the property owner or lessor. Thus, it would be contrary to law (on contract law) and public policy to allow possessors to use such possession for purposes of acquiring property via prescription.
c. Same; Same; Mere tolerance. Similarly, for possession by mere tolerance, the property owner should not be punished for exercising tolerance or patience over possessors who may be temporarily using the property, such as in the case of homeless persons.
Article 1120. Possession is interrupted for the purposes of prescription, naturally or civilly. (1943)
Notes:
1) Definition.
a. Interrupted or interruption – in the context of possession, refers to a disturbance in the possession, e.g., possessors left for some time then came back, them being forcible removed whether lawfully via court processes or unlawfully via illegal means.
b. Natural interruption – refers to a situation “when, for any cause whatsoever, [possession] ceases for more than one year.” (Arboso v. Andrade, En Banc, G.R. No. L-2176, December 29, 1950)
c. Civil interruption – “caused by the service of a summons upon the possessor, even should the judge who authorized its issue be without jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)
2) The 3 kinds of interruption. The following are the two (2) kinds of interruption:
(a) Natural interruption (See Articles 1121 and 1122);
(b) Civil interruption (See Article 1123); or
(c) Recognition by possessor or owner’s rights (Article 1125).
3) Interruption of prescription of actions v. Interruption of acquisitive prescription. “Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code.” (Virtucio v. Alegarbes, supra.)
Article 1121. Possession is naturally interrupted when through any cause it should cease for more than one year. The old possession is not revived if a new possession should be exercised by the same adverse claimant. (1944a)
Article 1122. If the natural interruption is for only one year or less, the time elapsed shall be counted in favor of the prescription. (n)
Notes:
1) Rules on natural interruption.
a. Any cause. The phrase “any cause” is unqualified and thus covers any reason, e.g., physical abandonment, unlawfully/forcibly disturbed in the possession, etc.
b. More than a year. This translates to 365 days plus 1 day. The year shall be counted as 365 days per Article 13 of the Civil Code.
c. Same; No revival if there has been a natural interruption. If a natural interruption occurs, the return of the claimant shall be treated as a new possession. Thus, there is no revival or resuming of previous possession prior to natural interruption.
d. Less than a year. If natural interruption is one year or less, the claimant can include that duration of the interruption in counting for purposes of prescription.
Heirs of Sps. Suyam v. Heirs of Hulaton, G.R. No. 209081, June 19, 2019
• In the instant case, the Court does not find any cogent reason to reverse the CA’s factual finding that “there was no natural interruption, for prescription, in [the Heirs of Feliciano’s] possession of the subject land.” The Court finds the factual conclusion of the CA to be with basis.
• To reiterate, it was even stipulated by both parties during the pre-trial that “the [Heirs of Feliciano] have been in possession of the land in question for a long time, but the [Heirs of Sps. Suyam] have never been in possession thereof despite the fact that they are residents of the same place where the land is located (Dipintin, Maddela, Quirino).” Hence, it cannot now be disputed that the Heirs of Feliciano have been possessing the subject property for a great length of time.
• As found by the CA, the testimony of Consolacion clearly established that she was born in the subject property in 1938 and that her family has been in possession of the subject property in 1938. In fact, her testimony established that the family was able to erect a house that still stands on the subject property up to this day.44 Consolacion herself continued to reside on the subject property until 1974 or 1975 when she transferred her residence to Pangasinan.
• The aforesaid is corroborated by the testimony of Cipriano, the tenant of the subject property, who testified that the subject property was owned and possessed by his uncle Feliciano and that he was entrusted the subject property as a tenant by the latter. Cipriano unequivocally testified that from the time he began tilling the subject property in 1966 up to the present time as the tenant of the Heirs of Feliciano, no other person appeared to claim ownership over the subject property.
• Despite Consolacion’s transfer of residence to Pangasinan in 1974 or 1975, it cannot be argued that the possession of the subject property by the Heirs of Feliciano ceased to be continuous, considering that prior to Consolacion’s transfer to Pangasinan, the Heirs of Feliciano had instituted Cipriano as the tenant of the Heirs of Feliciano since 1966, continuously tilling and cultivating the subject property for the Heirs of Feliciano.
• Further solidifying the aforesaid testimonies, the CA likewise notes that the Heirs of Feliciano have been consistently paying realty taxes and declaring the subject property for tax purposes. While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute credible proof of a claim of title over the property. Coupled with actual possession of the property, tax declarations become strong evidence of ownership.
Article 1123. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. (1945a)
Article 1124. Judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption:
(1) If it should be void for lack of legal solemnities;
(2) If the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse;
(3) If the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
In all these cases, the period of the interruption shall be counted for the prescription. (1946a)
Notes:
1) Rules on civil interruption.
a. Judicial summons, required. “Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to run.” (Virtucio v. Alegarbes, G.R. No. 187451, August 29, 2012)
b. Same; When not effective. Even if judicial summons have been issued, they shall not be effective in these cases:
(1) If it should be void for lack of legal solemnities;
(2) If the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse;
(3) If the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
c. Same; Same; Interruption favors prescription. In the above cases involving ineffective judicial summons, the claimant can include that duration of the interruption in counting for purposes of prescription.
d. Mere notice of adverse claim, insufficient. “[A] mere Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute an effective interruption of possession.” (Virtucio v. Alegarbes, citing Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, supra.)
Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, supra.
• Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law.35 In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.
e. Protest filed in administrative agency, insufficient. “In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency and even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. In such an instance, no civil interruption can take place. Only in cases filed before the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession.” (Virtucio v. Alegarbes, G.R. No. 187451, August 29, 2012)
f. Possessor wins case. “[T]he service of such summons shall be inoperative and shall not cause interruption if the suit against the possession should be decided in his favor.” (Arboso v. Andrade, En Banc, supra.)
Article 1125. Any express or tacit recognition which the possessor may make of the owner’s right also interrupts possession. (1948)
Notes:
1) Definition.
a. Recognition – refers to admission or acknowledgment.
2) The 2 kinds of recognition. The possessor may recognize the owner’s right as follows:
(a) Express recognition; or
(b) Tacit recognition.
3) Rules on recognition by possessor.
a. Interrupts possession. If the possessor recognizes the owner’s right, this will result in interruption.
b. Neither natural nor civil interruption. This kind of interruption is sui generis, as it is neither natural interruption nor judicial interruption.
c. No rules on reviving possession. There are no accompanying rules on whether this kind of interruption may be revived if it turns out that the owner’s right was void ab initio or there was a mistake of fact on the part of the possessor.
Article 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary prescription of ownership or real rights shall not take place to the prejudice of a third person, except in virtue of another title also recorded; and the time shall begin to run from the recording of the latter.
As to lands registered under the Land Registration Act, the provisions of that special law shall govern. (1949a)
Notes:
1) Rules on Title recorded in the Registry of Property.
a. General Rule: No ordinary prescription against third person. A person seeking to make a claim of ownership via ordinary prescription, whether acquisitive or extinctive, cannot do so against a third person: (a) who has a Title recorded in the Registry of Property; or, (b) who may have subsequently acquired the property under a Title recorded in the Registry of Property.
NB:
1) The article follows the principle of indefeasibility of titles.
2) There is an exception, see below.
b. Same; Principle of indefeasibility of title. “[A] person dealing with a registered land has the right to rely on the face of the Torrens title and need not inquire further, unless the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such an inquiry.” (Cagatao v. Almonte, G.R. No. 174004, October 09, 2013)
“The indefeasibility of a Torrens title as evidence of lawful ownership of the property protects buyers in good faith who rely on what appears on the face of the said certificate of title. Moreover, a potential buyer is charged with notice of only the burdens and claims annotated on the title.” (Ibid.)
c. Same; Same; Adoption of Torrens System. “The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.”
d. Same; Same; Same; Purpose. “The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire, rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of property.” (Ibid.)
e. Exception: Another title also recorded. If for some reason a separate and another title is recorded in the Registry of Property to which the possessor may build on a claim, this may be able to override the other Title: Provided, That the requirement for ordinary prescription is met considering that the counting shall reckon from the recording of Title to which the claimant is relying on, and not actual possession (which may be earlier).
2) Lands registered under Land Registration Act. For lands registered under the Land Registration Act, the specifical provisions therein shall be observed.
Article 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. (1950a)
Article 1128. The conditions of good faith required for possession in articles 526, 527, 528, and 529 of this Code are likewise necessary for the determination of good faith in the prescription of ownership and other real rights. (1951)
Notes:
1) Definitions.
a. Good faith – “good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.” (Civil Code, Article 1127)
2) Rules on good faith for possession. The following articles apply in determining good faith for purposes of prescription of ownership and real rights:
a. Article 526, Civil Code: “[Par. 1] He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it…. [Par. 2] He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing… [Par. 3] Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.”
b. Article 527, Civil Code: “Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.”
c. Article 528, Civil Code: “Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.”
d. Article 529, Civil Code: “It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.”
Article 1129. For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. (n)
Article 1130. The title for prescription must be true and valid. (1953)
Article 1131. For the purposes of prescription, just title must be proved; it is never presumed. (1954a)
Notes:
1) Definition.
e. Just title – “[f]or the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.” (Ibid., Article 1129)
2) Title, proof required. The just title referred to must be actually proven, as it cannot be presumed. For example, claimant purchased the rights to a property which later on turns out that the seller did not have rights thereto.
Article 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribes through uninterrupted possession for eight years, without need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or of which he has been illegally deprived, as well as with respect to movables acquired in a public sale, fair, or market, or from a merchant’s store the provisions of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed. (1955a)
Article 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired through prescription by the offender. (1956a)
Notes:
1) Rules on the prescription for movables or personal property.
a. 4-year uninterrupted possession in good faith. Via prescription, a person acquires ownership over movables after four (4) years of uninterrupted possession in good faith. (This is the interpretation if a party seeks to prove ordinary acquisitive prescription. However, as noted in the next paragraph, the provision is silent on what kind of prescription is referred to by the article.)
NB: Technically, the provision does not specify whether the prescription contemplated is: (a) from the point of view of the previous owner, who loses ownership via extinctive prescription, ownership is lost); or (b) from the point of view of the new owner, who loses ownership via acquisitive prescription. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. (Sps. Plopenio v. DAR, G.R. No. 161090 and 161092, July 4, 2012)
b. 8-year uninterrupted possession. Via prescription, and without need of any other condition (meaning: good faith is not necessary), a person acquires ownership over movables after eight (8) years of uninterrupted possession.
2) Rules on movables that were lost illegally deprived from owner
a. Article 559, Civil Code: “[Par. 1] The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same… [Par. 2] If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.”
NB: In contrast with movables possessed through a crime (see below), a person may be unlawfully deprived of movables or personal properties without it necessarily being the result of or through a crime, e.g., mistake of fact – persons taking another person’s ball pen incorrectly thinking that the pen was theirs (as theft require intent to gain, no crime is committed yet the taking was unlawful).
b. Article 1505, Civil Code: “[Par. 1] Subject to the provisions of this Title, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell… [Par. 2] Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect: … (1) The provisions of any factors’ act, recording laws, or any other provision of law enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner thereof; … (2) The validity of any contract of sale under statutory power of sale or under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction; … (3) Purchases made in a merchant’s store, or in fairs, or markets, in accordance with the Code of Commerce and special laws.”
3) Rules on movables possessed through a crime.
a. No ordinary acquisitive prescription. The article makes it clear that no ordinary acquisitive prescription shall attach to movables that are/were possessed through a crime, such as theft, regardless of the number of years of uninterrupted possession.
Article 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. (1957a)
Article 1135. In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater, or less than that expressed in his title, prescription shall be based on the possession. (n)
Article 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (1959a)
Notes:
1) Rules on the prescription for ownership and other real rights over immovable property.
a. 10-year possession in good faith and with just title. The article is read with Article 1117 of the Civil Code. Thus: a person acquires ownership and other real rights over immovable after 10years of possession in good faith and just title. (Article 1134 cf. Article 1117)
b. Same; Article 1117, Civil Code: “[Par. 1] Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary… [Par. 2] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.”
c. 30-year uninterrupted possession. Via prescription, and without need of title or of good faith, a person acquires ownership and other real rights over immovables after 30 years of uninterrupted adverse possession.
2) Possession by mistake on area size. If there is a mistake in the possession of an area, whether greater or lesser than the one stated in the Title, the adverse claimant may only rely on prescription over the mistaken area via possession thereof.
Article 1136. Possession in wartime, when the civil courts are not open, shall not be counted in favor of the adverse claimant. (n)
Notes:
1) Rule on possession in war time.
a. No acquisitive prescription. There is no acquisitive prescription in case of wartime and when the civil courts are not open.
b. Same; Rationale. This is due to the fact that the owners dispossessed of their property will not be able to seek legal action to protect their rights, such as via civil interruption through judicial summons.
NB: There is, however, the question of what if the courts were open but it is wartime. Under this provision, it suggests that there may be acquisitive prescription as property owners may still go to court to obtain judicial summons.
Article 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest;
(2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary;
(3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (1960a)
Notes:
1) Definition.
a. Tacking – refers to continuing another’s possession.
1) Rules on computation of time necessary for prescription.
a. Rule 1: Tacking. Through a grantor or predecessor in interest, a claimant/possessor may tack on or continue the possession in order to complete the remaining period necessary for prescription.
b. Rule 2: Presumption of possession.
General Rule: Possessors enjoy the presumption that they are in possession during the intervening time between their previous possession and present possession.
Exception: unless otherwise proven.
c. Rule 3: First day out, last day in. This reiterates the rule under Paragraph 3, Article 13, Civil Code, viz.: “In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.”
