Clavecilla v. Clavecilla (2023)

CASE DETAILS
Case Title	Clavecilla v. Clavecilla
Citation	G.R. No. 228127, 06 March 2023
Penned by	Gesmundo, C.J.

1. Background

• Petitioner [Fernando] and Marivic met through a common friend sometime in December 1986. Petitioner was a finance officer at the Philippine Embassy in Saudi Arabia, while Marivic worked as a staff nurse at a private hospital in Jeddah. Petitioner was so smitten by Marivic’s striking physical attributes that he courted her until they became sweethearts.

• Since her employment contract was to expire by the yearend of 1987, Marivic informed petitioner that she would be returning to the Philippines. Apprehensive that he may lose her, petitioner proposed marriage which Marivic accepted after several discussions and considerations. Thus, on December 10, 1987, the couple exchanged marital vows at the Office of the Philippine Consulate General in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. They again celebrated their marriage on March 12, 1988 at St. Pancratius Chapel, Paco Park, Manila. They were blessed with a child, Patrick Joshua, who was born on September 21, 1993.

• On November 14, 2006, petitioner filed a Verified Petition  for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Marivic and faulted her for being psychologically incapacitated to assume her marital obligations. He averred that during the initial period of their marriage, Marivic had been carefree, and was a consistent nagger and a very demanding wife, who preferred the company of friends instead of staying home to attend to the needs of her family. He also claimed that Marivic had no interest in looking for employment despite his prodding, and did not exert effort to provide for his basic needs. Also, without his knowledge, Marivic obtained loans, and one creditor of which she failed to pay filed a legal action against petitioner before the Department of Foreign Affairs, which placed his employment in jeopardy.

• Petitioner claimed that in order to avoid confrontation and to save their marriage, he would remain submissive to the will and caprices of Marivic. After realizing that she would no longer change, he finally decided to leave sometime in June 2005.

• Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted and testified on the results of the psychological examination she conducted on petitioner, and concluded that he was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) which resulted in his lack of concern for the overall welfare of his marriage. Dr. Tayag traced petitioner’s deficient personality condition from his early formative years. Dr. Tayag concluded that petitioner’s psychological incapacity is incurable, and that his marriage which was not founded on mutual trust, love, respect, and commitment, is beyond repair. Dr. Tayag also submitted her separate interviews on petitioner’s friends, namely, Fidelis Q. Apalisok (Apalisok) and Feliciano Pimentel (Pimentel), to supplement her report on petitioner’s psychological condition.

• In her Answer, Marivic denied being a carefree, consistent nagger, and demanding wife who is inconsiderate of the needs of her family. She argued that being the guilty spouse, petitioner cannot come to court to plea for annulment. She also claimed to have discovered petitioner’s psychological incapacity after their marriage, which was manifested by his irresponsible and abnormal attitude, as well as selfishness, especially on financial matters. Since petitioner did not provide for financial support, Marivic found work in his postings abroad.  She also alleged that in June 1994, petitioner started spending most of his time outside their home with friends, and even engaged in adulterous relationships. She described petitioner to have become “obsessed with his own personal desires” that he had forgotten his obligation to sufficiently provide financial support, especially to Patrick Joshua.

2. SC Decision/Resolution

• [Marriage is valid.]

Either spouse may petition the court to declare their marriage as null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

• Marivic avers that petitioner came to court with unclean hands, having allegedly engaged in extramarital affairs and, thereafter, claimed to be psychologically incapacitated in order to break free from the marriage bond. As such, he should not be allowed to benefit from his own misdeed.

• The Court would like to clarify that although sexual infidelity is a ground for legal separation under Art. 55 of the Family Code, it may be deemed as a manifestation of psychological incapacity. Castillo v. Republic elucidated that there must be evidence linking the unfaithfulness with the inability to perform essential spousal obligations:

In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

• Accordingly, the allegation of marital infidelity cannot be automatically ruled as an invalid ground to declare a marriage void ab initio. As long as the alleged sexual infidelity stemmed from the psychological incapacity of the unfaithful spouse, then it can be a valid ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

• Another point that needs further elucidation, concerns Marivic’s reference to the principle of unclean hands as a bar against a purported psychologically incapacitated spouse to initiate a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

• At any rate, the Court does not see any reason why the principle of clean hands should prevent a psychologically incapacitated spouse from initiating a proceeding to annul a marriage. This is because there is no party at fault in case of annulment of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Culpability cannot be imputed on the part of the spouse said to be psychologically incapacitated since it is not deliberate or intentional on his or her part to possess such personality trait. By reason of psychological incapacity, it cannot be said that bad faith had motivated the afflicted spouse to enter into a marriage or to even seek for a declaration of its nullity. It must be emphasized that the unclean hands doctrine only avails in cases of inequity, which does not exist in a marriage sought to be annulled on the basis of psychological incapacity of a spouse to comprehend and discharge the concomitant marital obligations.

• Most importantly, Art. 36 of the Family Code does not prohibit the psychologically incapacitated spouse from initiating the action. Indeed, under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, (the Rule) the Court allows either of the spouses to file the petition, alleging specifically, the facts showing the incapacity of either or both of them:

Section 2. Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

x x x x

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)

• The recent case of Republic v. Claur reinforces Sec. 2(d) of the Rule that a petition for nullity of marriage may be filed by either spouses, whether incapacitated or not. In this case, both the wife and the husband were found to have been psychologically incapacitated. Verily, the courts do not limit the right to initiate a petition to nullify the marriage to the spouse who is not psychologically incapacitated.

• It therefore becomes of no moment whether the spouse should be free from psychological incapacity before he or she may be allowed to petition the courts for nullity of marriage. What is relevant is for the petition to contain specific allegations of the incapacity of either or both spouses from complying with the essential marital obligations at the time of the marriage.

• It likewise bears emphasizing that the minutes of the February 9, 1984 Joint Meeting of the Civil Code Revision and the IBP Family Law Committees provide proper perspective on the intention of the framers to allow either spouses, whether psychologically incapacitated or not, to initiate the petition. The relevant portions of the minutes read:

I. Comments and Suggestions of Archbishop Oscar Cruz on the Proposed Provision on Judicial Declaration of Invalidity of Marriage

A. Article 1.

Either party may obtain a judicial declaration that a marriage is invalid whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that any of the following grounds existed at but was made manifest after the celebration of the marriage;

1) That either party was wanting in the use of reason to appreciate the nature of marriage as permanent union between man and woman for the establishment of a family and the creation of reciprocal rights and duties essential to marriage;

2) That either party acted under a mistake regarding the identity or capacity to marry of the other at the time of the celebration of the marriage;

3) That either party was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential obligations of marriage as prescribed in the next succeeding article.

On the opening phrase “Either party may”, Bishop Cruz inquired if the same would mean that the culpable cause of nullity can also file action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage. Justice Reyes explained that the said phrase was being proposed inasmuch as ordinary annulment of marriage is open only to innocent parties. Bishop Cruz remarked that if this is the intention, then there is no estoppel if one is the culpable cause.

Director Romero stated that they also intend to keep the provisions on annulment of marriage.

• Clearly, the intent of the framers was to enable either party to file the petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity unlike the other grounds for declaring a marriage void. Such was the intent of the framers of the Family Code that, even during the August 2 and August 9, 1986 meetings of the Civil Code Revision and the IBP Family Law Committees, there was no mention on whether the spouse who may initiate the action should be free from any psychological incapacity:

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of the marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno formulated the next article as follows:

Article 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that “even if” be substituted with “although”. On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause “although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization” be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Evident from the abovequoted minutes that what is required in filing a petition for nullity of marriage is the presence of psychological incapacity. It will not be significant to the courts whether the petitioner spouse is free from such incapacity. The only requirement is that at least one of them is psychologically incapacitated to comprehend and discharge their marital obligations. If the intention of the framers was to prohibit the incapacitated spouse, they would have expressly stated so, similar to actions to annul a voidable marriage under Art. 47 of the Family Code.

Standards in determining psychological incapacity

• Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended, contemplates an inability to assume basic marital obligations. It does not simply relate to a mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in performing marital obligations or ill will.

• [In Tan-Andal v. Andal], [t]he Court ruled that since psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder, the proof required should be that which will establish the durable or enduring aspects of the spouse’s personality structure. Such personality structure manifests as clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family by disabling the affected spouse to understand and comply with the essential marital obligations.

• Since psychological incapacity relates to the personality structure of spouses, Tan-Andal declared that the element of incurability required by Art. 36 of the Family Code be determined from a legal, not medical, point of view. It must be enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, which will inevitably result in the irreparable breakdown of the marriage. This personality aspect need not be proven by an expert, but may be established by ordinary witnesses who have consistently observed the behavior of the incapacitated spouse.

• Evidently, the prevailing standards in determining psychological incapacity were those laid down in Tan-Andal. Hence, the Court, in Cayabyab-Navarrosa v. Navarrosa, accordingly refined the requisites of juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity in determining psychological incapacity as follows:

In light of the Court’s fundamental paradigm shift in viewing psychological incapacity as a purely legal, rather than a medical concept, the understanding of the requisites in determining psychological incapacity, namely, juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity, must be refined accordingly.

With regard to the requisite of incurability, it must now be recognized that psychological incapacity is incurable only in the legal (not medical) sense in that the incapacity is “so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.” In order for the said requisite to obtain, there must be “[a]n undeniable pattern of a persisting failure to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse that must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other.”

Meanwhile, the requisite of gravity in psychological incapacity must be such that it is caused by a genuinely psychic cause, and not just “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes [or] occasional emotional outbursts” nor mere “refusal, neglect[,] difficulty, much less ill will.” As such, “a deeper and fuller assessment of the alleged incapacity must be done such that it is clearly and convincingly shown that the fulfillment of the essential marital obligations is not merely feigned or cumbersome but rather, practically impossible, because of the distinct psychological makeup of the person relative to his or her spouse.”

Lastly, the requisite of juridical antecedence (which – to note – is explicitly necessitated by the phrase “at the time of the celebration of the marriage” in Article 36) means that the incapacity is determined to exist during the time of celebration. While it may indeed be difficult – if not scientifically impossible – to determine the existence of psychological incapacity at the exact point in time that the couple exchanged their ‘I dos,’ it is sufficient, however, that the petitioner demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the incapacity, in all reasonable likelihood, already exists at the time of the marriage’s celebration. To determine the reasonable likelihood of its existence at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the Court, in Tan-Andal, held that “proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior.”

Moreover, the concept of juridical antecedence must be understood to include the ordinary experiences of the spouses not only prior to the marriage itself, but more importantly, during their “lived conjugal life” together since, as the law itself states, a marriage can be declared null and void under Article 36 “even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” As the parties have yet to assume any of the essential marital obligations prior to being married, the Court discerns that the experience of marriage itself is the litmus test of self-realization, reflecting one’s true psychological makeup as to whether or not he or she was indeed capable of assuming the essential marital obligations to his or her spouse at the time the marriage was entered into.

Therefore, in order to determine juridical antecedence, “judges must reconstruct the marital decision-making process of an individual, just like inquisitive investigators. The judge must trace back and examine all the manifestations before and during marriage to find out if such non-fulfillment relates to the intrinsic psychological makeup of the person relative to his or her specific partner, and not just some mere difficulty that ordinary spouses, at some point in time, are bound to go through.

Overall, the focus should be on the manifestations during the marriage itself since, as intended by Canon Law from which psychological incapacity was patterned after, the lived conjugal life is that which provides a confirmation of the original consent or its absence at the time of the marriage’s celebration. Since there is no way to determine the existence of psychological incapacity at the exact point that vows were exchanged, it is enough that it exists at such time in all reasonable likelihood. This is determined, in turn, by the manifestations and circumstances attending before, and most significantly, during the marriage. (Underscoring supplied, emphases omitted)

• Finally, the Court, in Tan-Andal, declared that what the plaintiff-spouse in nullity cases under Art. 36 of the Family Code needs, is clear and convincing evidence. Such quantum of proof requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• Based on these guidelines, the Court will now determine whether petitioner was able to establish his claim of psychological incapacity. It must be emphasized that petitioner primarily insists that it is Marivic who is psychologically incapacitated, while the finding of Dr. Tayag that he was the one afflicted with incapacity, was his alternative argument. Hence, the following discussion will not only focus on whether there is clear and convincing evidence to establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity, but also whether he has sufficiently proven his claim that it was Marivic who failed to discharge and comprehend the essential marital obligations.  

Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence of psychological incapacity either on his or on Marivic’s part.

• To recall, petitioner described Marivic as carefree, a consistent nagger, and a very demanding wife, who preferred the company of friends. However, his claims not only remained to be unsubstantiated, but were also insufficient to establish psychological incapacity. His complaints against Marivic appear to be minor, and do not have any relevance to her inability to perform essential marital obligations.

• Petitioner laments that Marivic appears to have no interest in contributing to the family’s income despite his prodding. Still, this allegation is not enough to convince the Court of her psychological incapacity.

• The standards in determining whether Marivic is psychologically incapacitated are laid down in Arts. 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Said provisions refer to spousal obligations which range from living together, observing mutual love, respect and fidelity, rendering mutual help and support, fixing the family domicile, support, and management of the household. Despite this myriad of spousal obligations, it was only in one aspect where Marivic, in the eyes of petitioner, failed in her duties, effectively admitting that she had no difficulty in performing the remaining obligations.

• Regardless, Marivic was able to sufficiently refute petitioner’s allegations of her supposed inability and unwillingness to contribute to the family’s income. The documents she presented (i.e. the certification from the International Operations Group of the Pag-IBIG Fund, Contract of Services with the Philippine Overseas Labor Office in Milan, Italy, etc.) reasonably prove that she was able to find work during their marriage, thus, enabling her to also provide for the financial needs of the family.

• Neither can petitioner rely on the interview conducted by Dr. Tayag on Apalisok and Pimentel, who related that Marivic did not exert any effort to find work. Their interviews did not provide any specific circumstances that could have established Marivic’s indifference to the needs of her family in relation to her duties as a wife.

• To reiterate, psychological incapacity does not simply connote difficulty, refusal, or neglect in performing marital obligations. It is pertinent to prove, based on the ruling in Tan-Andal, that the spouse is incapable of discharging those obligations by reason of a dysfunctional personality structure. Evidently, petitioner failed to establish his claim that Marivic was the psychologically incapacitated spouse.

• In a similar vein, the Court rejects petitioner’s alternative argument that he is psychologically incapacitated based on Dr. Tayag’s findings. He insists that Dr. Tayag’s report had established the root cause, gravity, incurability, and incapacitating nature of his NPD.

• The Court remains unpersuaded.

• The ruling in Tan-Andal is clear that there must be proof of the consistent behavior of the psychologically incapacitated spouse. This shall consist of an undeniable pattern of failing to be present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive. There was none in this case.

• Petitioner heavily relied on the report of Dr. Tayag, but there was nothing in her report which indicated a pattern indicating his inability to perform the essential spousal obligations. The said report merely provided a general description of petitioner’s family background without explaining how his relationship with his family, and even significant experiences during childhood, may have affected his personality structure. Being the youngest in the family with parents who want him to be strong and not pathetic, would not suffice to convince the Court that such aspirations from his parents would affect, later on, his interpersonal relationships and inability to comprehend and discharge spousal duties.

• To be clear, the Court does not doubt the diagnosis of Dr. Tayag – this is one aspect of the report that the Court will not tread on, as it is not an expert in the field of psychology or human behavior. However, her report lacked specific instances of petitioner’s behavior inconsistent with that of a husband who is always present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive towards Marivic.

• The interviews conducted on Apalisok and Pimentel likewise did not offer any glimpse into petitioner’s personality traits and behavior before and during his marriage with Marivic.

• More importantly, petitioner failed to impress upon the Court that his NPD impaired his ability to discharge the essential marital obligations under Arts. 68 to 71 of the Family Code. To reiterate, psychological incapacity should be viewed in the legal sense, and not in the medical sense. In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish that his enduring personality structure rendered him incapable of comprehending and discharging his marital obligations in terms of juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability in the legal sense.