Collusion, A56(5) Family Code
1. Concept
Collusion –
• … refers to a “secret agreement or cooperation especially for an illegal or deceitful purpose”. (Merriam-Webster, n.d. Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collusion [Accessed: 17 April 2025])
• … in divorce or legal separation means the agreement… “between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce”. (Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 69 N. J. Eq. 689 60 Atl. 1099; Sandoz vs. Sandoz, 107 Ore. 282, 214 Pas. 590., cited in De Ocampo v. Florenciano, En Banc, G.R. No. L-13553, 23 February 1960, Per Bengzon, J.)
• … “the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings” (Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and Separation, Section 500. cited in Browm v. Yambao, En Banc, G.R. No. L-10699, 18 October 1957)
2. Collusion
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
x x x
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; x x x
1) Collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation is a ground for denying legal separation.
2) A petition for legal separation will be denied if the spouses have secretly teamed up or conspired to fake or exaggerate a situation in order to fool the court into granting the separation. This type of dishonest cooperation is called collusion. It usually involves both parties pretending that one of them committed a serious offense—like infidelity or abuse—just to obtain a legal separation, even though it may not have happened or was mutually agreed upon for convenience. The law does not allow couples to manipulate the justice system through such deception. (OpenAI ChatGPT-4 [2025], reviewed by J. Del Puerto. Available at: https://chat.openai.com [Accessed: 18 April 2025])
De Ocampo v. Florenciano, En Banc, G.R. No. L-13553, 23 February 1960, Per Bengzon, J.:
• The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she “like also” to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
• Needless to say, when the court is informed that defendant equally desires the separation and admitted the commission of the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists. (The Court of Appeals did not find collusion.)
• In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor.
• Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
• In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. (Williams vs. Williams, [N. Y.] 40 N. E. (2d) 1017; Rosenweig vs. Rosenweig, 246 N. Y. Suppl. 231; Conyers, vs. Conyers, 224 S. W. [2d] 688.).
• And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion. (Pohlman vs. Pohlman, [N. J.] 46 Atl. Rep. 658.).
• We do not think plaintiff’s failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she “left” him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
• Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred the husband’s consent to or condonation of his wife’s misconduct. However, upon careful examination, a vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who “left” her husband.
• Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband’s petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.
a. Policy
1) The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made depend upon the parties themselves… It is consonant with this policy that the injury by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not. (Browm v. Yambao, En Banc, G.R. No. L-10699, 18 October 1957; NB: Although the case cites Civil Code provisions, it is submitted that the rationale applies as well to the Family Code equivalent provisions.]
Browm v. Yambao, En Banc, G.R. No. L-10699, 18 October 1957, Per Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
• On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document (Annex A) liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share…
• As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously objected to by Brown’s counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife’s adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code…
• Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as consel for the defaulting wife, “when the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state.”.
• The argument is untenable… it was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife’s default was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is obviously the fact of Brown’s cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.
• It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
3. Examples
Example 1 – Marco and Felice:
Both Marco and Felice wanted to end their marriage but didn’t want to go through an annulment. To speed up the process, they agreed that Marco would pretend to have an affair. Felice then filed for legal separation, claiming adultery as the ground. Since they were both in on the plan and coordinated the lie, the court could deny their petition due to collusion. (OpenAI ChatGPT-4 [2025], reviewed by J. Del Puerto, supra.)
Example 2 – Jared and Monica:
Monica and Jared wanted to separate legally so they could each pursue new relationships. They decided to create false evidence of abandonment by staging Jared’s departure and fabricating messages. Monica then filed a legal separation case based on Jared’s supposed desertion. However, because the entire narrative was jointly manufactured, the court may refuse to grant separation on the basis of collusion. (Ibid.)
Example 3 – Isabel and Renzo:
Renzo was at risk of losing property in a pending lawsuit. To protect their assets, he and Isabel plotted to file for legal separation and transfer some properties to Isabel, pretending that their marriage had broken down due to [grossly abusive conduct]. Isabel submitted a petition, claiming Renzo mistreated her. Since the entire scenario was designed to deceive the court and gain an advantage, the petition would likely be dismissed for being a product of collusion. (Ibid.)
4. Miscellaneous
a. Collusion v. Connivance
| Collusion | Connivance |
| After the filing of legal separation | Before the filing of legal separation and for purposes of creating a ground for legal separation |
| Secret cooperation to get a decree of legal separation | Secret cooperation to get a decree of legal separation |
1) Collusion occurs when the petition for legal separation has already been filed and the parties have secretly agreed to help each other in order to successfully obtain a decree of legal separation.
2) On the other hand, connivance occurs before a petition for legal separation is filed as it relates to the secrete cooperation between the parties to create a ground for legal separation.
