Conjugal Partnership of Gains, A105-133 Family Code
1. General Provisions
Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this [Family] Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
1) Conjugal Partnership of Gains (CPG) – is a property regime where spouses have contractual agreed in their marriage settlement as to what would be contributed to the conjugal assets and what would be excluded. Thus, the main basis for CPG is the stipulations, i.e., terms and conditions, in the marriage settlement.
2) If two people planning to marry agree in a prenuptial agreement to use the conjugal partnership of gains as the system for managing their property during marriage, then the rules in this chapter of the Family Code will serve as a backup guide —they’ll only be used when the couple’s agreement or other applicable rules don’t already cover a situation. (OpenAI ChatGPT-4 [2025], reviewed by Legal / J. Del Puerto, Accessed 5 May 2025)
2) In addition, this chapter’s rules also apply to couples who were already under a conjugal partnership of gains before the Family Code took effect. However, this is limited, if any property rights were already earned or protected under the old Civil Code or other laws, those rights will be respected and won’t be overridden by the new rules. This principle is reinforced by Article 256 of the Family Code. (Ibid.)
Example 1: Before they got married in 2010, Dr. John Alcantar and Engr. Melissa De Vera agreed to a conjugal partnership of gains and executed a marriage settlement. Under the marriage settlement, they agreed that 50% of all their income from the practice of their profession would be contributed to the conjugal assets; however, all other sources of income, including any properties or assets they had before the marriage, will remain as exclusive properties even after they were married.
Example 2: Miguel and Ana, who plan to marry next year, sign a marriage settlement saying they’ll follow the conjugal partnership of gains. They don’t go into much detail in their agreement. Later, when they disagree on how to handle profits from a family-owned farm, they refer to the Family Code provisions as a fallback to guide them. (OpenAI ChatGPT-4 [2025], supra.)
Example 3: Mario and Teresa married in 1975, and their conjugal partnership was built on rules from the Civil Code. After the Family Code was introduced, they encountered a legal issue involving newly purchased rental property. Since their original agreement didn’t cover this modern scenario, they consulted the updated Family Code rules, but only where it didn’t conflict with rights they’d already secured before 1988. (Ibid.)
a. Concept
Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. (142a)
1) In a conjugal partnership of gains setup, the married couple [may stipulate that a portion of their wealth] that includes earnings and profits from their personal assets, as well as anything they acquire through work, business, or even luck during the marriage, [be made part of their conjugal assets]. (OpenAI ChatGPT-4 [2025], supra.)
2) When the marriage ends, either by separation, annulment, or death, the total net benefits gained during the union are split evenly between the spouses. This equal division is the default rule unless they have specifically agreed to different terms in a prenup or marriage settlement. (Ibid.)
3) NB 1: A CPG property regime is primarily contractual in nature, i.e. what the parties stipulated. Meaning, the parties are free to stipulate as to what would be contributed to the conjugal assets and to what extent. For example, parties may stipulate that only their earnings from their work or profession will be added/contributed to the conjugal assets, and thus all properties that they have prior to their marriage shall continue to be their respective exclusive properties. Further, they can agree that only 50% of said earnings will be contributed, or any other arrangement such as 60% from one spouse and 40% from the other. This is what it means by CPG being contractual – they can agree to their own terms and conditions.
4) NB 2: If parties stipulate that all their assets and properties, as well as all their income from whatever sources, be added/contributed to the conjugal assets, then this is no longer a CPG; rather, it is an Absolute Community of Property (ACP), in which case ACP provisions will apply.
5) NB 3: If parties stipulate that all their assets and properties, as well as all their income from whatever sources, be excluded and remain their separate properties, then this is no longer a CPG; rather an Absolute Separation of Property (ASP).
6) NB 4: If there are no stipulation and thus no marriage settlement, ACP shall automatically apply.
Example 1: Julio inherited a beachfront hut from his grandfather before marrying Lea. [In their marriage settlement, they agreed that the beachfront will remain the exclusive property of Julio; however, any income derived therefrom will form part of their conjugal assets.] During their marriage, he converted it into a resort that brought in steady income. Although the hut itself remained Julio’s exclusive property, all the income from guest bookings, food services, and tours became part of their conjugal fund. When the couple later separated, those earnings, despite originating from Julio’s own inheritance, were divided equally. (Ibid.)
Example 2: Angela won a brand-new car in a raffle during the marriage. Although she entered the contest alone, the car was considered part of the conjugal partnership because it was acquired by chance during the marriage. [In their marriage settlement, they stipulated that any earnings from a game of chance shall form part of their conjugal assets.] Years later, when the marriage was annulled, the car’s value was included in the pool of conjugal gains and split equally with her ex-husband, even though she was the sole winner. (Ibid.)
b. Governing rules
Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains. (n)
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. (147a)
Related provisions:
Article 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void. (145a)
Article 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property.
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. (146a)
1) Based on Articles 107 and 108, if the parties wish to enter a Conjugal Partnership of Gains (CPG) for their property regime, they should execute a marriage settlement or prenuptial agreement and stipulate therein their terms and conditions. This marriage settlement is a formal contract, i.e., it has to be in writing, signed by the parties, and notarized. Thereafter, the marriage settlement must be attached to their marriage contract and thereafter these documents have to be submitted to the Local Civil Registrar (LCR).
2) Any CPG marriage settlement executed after the marriage is void. In such a case, ACP applies.
c. Presumption: Favors Conjugal Property
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (160a)
Proof of acquisition – condition sine qua non
1) Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife”. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.13 The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. (Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. 102330, November 25, 1998, Per Quisumbing, J.)
2) In Malabanan v. Malabanan, Jr., we explained that property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, and it is unnecessary to prove that the money used to purchase a property came from the conjugal fund. What must be established is that the property was acquired during the marriage. This presumption was reiterated in Alexander v. Escalona, wherein we held that this presumption may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Notably, the presumption will still apply even if the property is under the name of only one spouse. Hence, when the property is acquired during the marriage, the burden of proof is upon the spouse claiming the property’s exclusivity to establish it. (Navye-Pua v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 253450, January 22, 2024, Per Lopez, M. J.)
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, 03 August 2015, Per Peralta, J.:
• The former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage. The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is “registered in the name of one or both of the spouses.” Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses’ joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. 102330, November 25, 1998, Per Quisumbing, J.:
• Petitioner [Wife] contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should administer these on account of the incapacity of her husband. On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by petitioner as “conjugal” are capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these were acquired by the latter either through inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage. Moreover, they stress that Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioner’s allegation.
• In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
• With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name.
• Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148 of the New Civil Code.
• Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio’s acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him, “during the marriage, by lucrative title.”
• As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver that these properties were either constructed or established by their father during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
• It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not…
• Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property in as much as the title thereto is registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco.”
• It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco”, is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase “married to” preceding “Teresita Francisco” is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco.
Rebuttable presumption
2) A rebuttable presumption is established in Article 116 and the party who invokes that presumption must first establish that the property was acquired during the marriage because the proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. It is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with conjugal funds and the presumption still applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Once the condition sine qua non is established, then the presumption that all properties acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one spouse or both spouses, are conjugal, remains until the contrary is proved. (Sps. Anastacio v. Heirs of Late Sps. Coloma and Parazo, G.R. No. 224572, 27 August 2020, Per Caguioa, J.)
Sps. Anastacio v. Heirs of Late Sps. Coloma and Parazo, G.R. No. 224572, 27 August 2020, Per Caguioa, J.:
• Petitioners [buyers of the property-in-question] argue that respondents [children of owners of the property] have the burden to prove that the subject property was owned by both Juan and Juliana [owners of the property], having made that allegation in the Complaint. They also take the position that TCT No. 56899 presents a conclusive presumption that the land described therein was the capital of, and owned exclusively by Juan and that Juan is stated in the said TCT to have been married to Juliana is merely descriptive of his civil status. Thus, petitioners claim that the [Deed of Absolute Sale] is valid and the consent of Juliana was not required when Juan sold the subject property to them.
• Given the very stipulations made during the Pre-Trial and TCT No. 56899, respondents had laid the predicate for the presumption under Article 116 to be invoked. They had established that the property was acquired during the marriage of their parents. To overcome the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership, petitioners were required to prove the contrary.
• Unfortunately, petitioners’ evidence that TCT No. 56899 was registered in the name of Juan married to Juliana and the sale from the previous owner, Valete, to Juan only mentioned Juan as the buyer fell short to overcome the presumption. In fact, such evidence even bolsters the presumption that respondents invoked. To reiterate, the presumption is created even if the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one spouse. Petitioners’ claim that Juan acquired the subject property by succession was belied by the inscription on both TCT No. 56899 and its predecessor title, TCT No. 53369, that the latter was being cancelled by virtue of the sale made by Valete in favor of Juan.
• Therefore, petitioners’ postulation that the certificate of title having been registered in the name of Juan married to Juliana establishes a conclusive presumption that the land described therein was owned exclusively by Juan is incorrect because it directly runs counter to Article 116 of the Family Code.
