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Defense of strangers, A11(3) Revised Penal Code

1. Concept

Defense of strangers – refers to a justifying circumstance wherein no criminal liability results for a crime committed by an accused who was defending a stranger.

Read more: Justifying circumstances

a. Legal basis

Article 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

(Revised Penal Code)

2. Defense of strangers

For the 3rd justifying circumstance: anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive

Elements of defense of stranger:

1) Unlawful aggression;

2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and

3) The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. (Masipequina v. CA, G.R. No. L-51206, August 25, 1989, Per Cortes, J.)

NB: The 1st and 2nd elements are the same for self-defense (A11[1]), defense of relatives (A11[2]), and defense of strangers (A11[3]). They only differ in the 3rd element. Thus, for the following discussions related to the 1st and 2nd elements, refer to related discussions in Self-defense (A11[1]).

1) Element 1: Unlawful aggression

In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense and defense of strangers are unavailing, because there would be nothing to repel. (People v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18, 2012, Per Bersamin, J.)

See related discussions in Self-defense (A11[1]).

2) Element 2: Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it

See related discussions in Self-defense (A11[1]).

3) Element 3: The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive

Oliveros, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 242552, March 03, 2021, Per Caguioa, J.:

• Petitioners [the Accused] try to justify their criminal acts by claiming that they acted in defense of a relative (Benjamin and Oliver) and in defense of a stranger (Maximo). However, this claim is belied by the evidence on record.

• [A]ssuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Glenn, the second requisite is likewise lacking because the means used by petitioners to prevent or repel the alleged attack by Glenn is not reasonable. Although it is true that the law does not require perfect equality of forces between the aggressor and the person making the defense, surely, the use of a bolo by the three (3) petitioners who were acting in conspiracy and helping each other against the bare hands of the victim is not at all commensurate, even if the latter is alleged to be a karate expert.

Masipequina v. CA, G.R. No. L-51206, August 25, 1989, Per Cortes, J.:

• 1. In the instant case, that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Leopoldo Potane had been adequately established, as discussed earlier with regard to the circumstance of self-defense.

• 2. Then, that the means employed by [the Accused] Alampayan [who was a patrolman] in trying to prevent Leopoldo Potane from further attacking Masipequina [co-accused and a patrolman] with a bolo were reasonable is clearly evident, as Alampayan only shot at Leopoldo Potane’s thigh to prevent him from further pursuing Masipequina who was trying to escape Leopoldo Potane’s attack.

• 3. Finally, that Alampayan was not motivated by any evil motive is shown by the fact that he, together with Masipequina, only proceeded to the place where the incident happened to look for Leopoldo Potane because they had been ordered by their substation commander to apprehend Leopoldo Potane who had shown signs of mental derangement and had threatened his relatives with a bolo. In short, the two policemen were in the performance of their official and lawful duties.

Paera v. People, G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011, Per Carpio, J.:

• None of these requisites obtain here. Not one of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties’ rights when petitioner successively threatened them with bodily harm. Indeed, all of them were performing ordinary, peaceful acts – Indalecio was standing near the water tank, Diosetea was walking towards Indalecio and Vicente was standing in the vegetable garden a few meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the Darongs’ repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme, causing him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.

Almeda v. CA, G.R. No. 120853, March 13, 1997, Per Francicso, J.:

• The first and crucial requisite for defense of strangers to prosper is absent in this case. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person. The mere cocking of the M-14 rifle by the victim (Cbl. Salabao) without aiming the firearm at any particular target, is not sufficient to conclude that the life of the Vice-Governor, Herrera or even of Amora was in imminent danger. A threatening or intimidating attitude per se does not constitute unlawful aggression.  Even a mysterious whisper poses no danger. There is nothing from the act of the victim in trying to stand up, from which the Court may infer that the life of the person (the Vice Governor) whom petitioner was allegedly protecting, was under actual threat or attack from the victim.

• Besides, assuming that such act of the victim posed an imminent danger, [the Accused] was able to check if not neutralize such danger, when a lightning speed, he held and pointed downward the rifle of the former and simultaneously poked his .45 caliber at the victim’s head. Moreover, when the victim fell down and staggered after [the Accused] shot him pointblank in the head, any supposed unlawful aggression by the former, assuming that it has begun, had ceased. If so, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Accordingly, [the Accused]’s contention that “he was forced to fire five more shots to defend the life of the Vice-Governor belongs to the realm of fantasy.”13

Moreover, the number, location and severity of the fatal wounds suffered by the victim belie the claim of defense of stranger but is indicative of a determined effort to kill. The victim was hit on the vital parts of his body — head, lungs, heart, chest and neck.

3. Things to note

The following are some additional things to note about this offense.

a. Retaliation

Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. (Belbis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012, Per Peralta, J.)

Belbis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012, Per Peralta, J.:

• [T]he unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased when [the Accused] Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Although there was still some struggle involved between the victim and [the Accused] Rodolfo, there is no doubt that the latter, who was in possession of the same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused Such an aggression can also be surmised on the four stab wounds sustained by the victim on his back. It is hard to believe based on the location of the stab wounds, all at the back portion of the body (right lumbar area, left lumbar area, left buttock, medial aspect and left buttock, lateral aspect), that [the Accused] Rodolfo was defending himself. It would have been different if the wounds inflicted were located in the front portion of the victim’s body.

References

Title I – Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability, Book I, Act No. 3815, Revised Penal Code