Estrada v. Escritor (2006)*
[Editor’s Note: This 2006 case stems from the 2003 case. Both are En Banc cases involving the same parties.]
Estrada v. Escritor, En Banc, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006, Per Puno, J.:
1. Background
• In our decision dated August 4, 2003, after a long and arduous scrutiny into the origins and development of the religion clauses in the United States (U.S.) and the Philippines, we held that in resolving claims involving religious freedom (1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the religion clauses in our Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondent’s plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause (from the law with which she is administratively charged), it is the compelling state interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.
• Notwithstanding the above rulings, the Court could not, at that time, rule definitively on the ultimate issue of whether respondent was to be held administratively liable for there was need to give the State the opportunity to adduce evidence that it has a more “compelling interest” to defeat the claim of the respondent to religious freedom. Thus, in the decision dated August 4, 2003, we remanded the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene in the case so it can:
(a) examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice;
(b) present evidence on the state’s “compelling interest” to override respondent’s religious belief and practice; and
(c) show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom.
• It bears stressing, therefore, that the residual issues of the case pertained NOT TO WHAT APPROACH THIS COURT SHOULD TAKE IN CONSTRUING THE RELIGION CLAUSES, NOR TO THE PROPER TEST APPLICABLE IN DETERMINING CLAIMS OF EXEMPTION BASED ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION. These issues have already been ruled upon prior to the remand, and constitute “the law of the case” insofar as they resolved the issues of which framework and test are to be applied in this case, and no motion for its reconsideration having been filed. The only task that the Court is left to do is to determine whether the evidence adduced by the State proves its more compelling interest. This issue involves a pure question of fact.
2. SC Decision/Resolution
• We now resume from where we ended in our August 4, 2003 Decision. As mentioned, what remained to be resolved, upon which remand was necessary, pertained to the final task of subjecting this case to the careful application of the compelling state interest test, i.e., determining whether respondent is entitled to exemption, an issue which is essentially factual or evidentiary in nature.
• On the sincerity of religious belief, the Solicitor General categorically concedes that the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice are beyond serious doubt.Thus, having previously established the preliminary conditions required by the compelling state interest test, i.e., that a law or government practice inhibits the free exercise of respondent’s religious beliefs, and there being no doubt as to the sincerity and centrality of her faith to claim the exemption based on the free exercise clause, the burden shifted to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice justifies a compelling secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that objective.
• A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to demonstrate “the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests” which could limit or override respondent’s fundamental right to religious freedom. Neither did the government exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.
• There has never been any question that the state has an interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the sound administration of justice. Indeed, the provisions by which respondent’s relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and even the provisions on marriage and family in the Civil Code and Family Code, all clearly demonstrate the State’s need to protect these secular interests.
• Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights – “the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,” in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
• Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in “protecting the institutions of marriage and the family,” or even “in the sound administration of justice” that must be weighed against respondent’s claim, but the State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondent’s faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted.This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
• To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s application of the compelling interest test, the State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to prosecute respondent nor her partner. The State’s asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003, to deny the exemption would effectively break up “an otherwise ideal union of two individuals who have managed to stay together as husband and wife [approximately twenty-five years]” and have the effect of defeating the very substance of marriage and the family.
• The Solicitor General also argued against respondent’s religious freedom on the basis of morality, i.e., that “the conjugal arrangement of respondent and her live-in partner should not be condoned because adulterous relationships are constantly frowned upon by society”;and “that State laws on marriage, which are moral in nature, take clear precedence over the religious beliefs and practices of any church, religious sect or denomination on marriage. Verily, religious beliefs and practices should not be permitted to override laws relating to public policy such as those of marriage.”
• The above arguments are mere reiterations of the arguments raised by Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago in her dissenting opinion to our Decision dated August 4, 2003, which she offers again in toto. These arguments have already been addressed in our decision dated August 4, 2003.In said Decision, we noted that Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago’s dissenting opinion dwelt more on the standards of morality, without categorically holding that religious freedom is not in issue…
• Again, we note the arguments raised by Mr. Justice Carpio with respect to charging respondent with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and we reiterate that the dissent offends due process as respondent was not given an opportunity to defend herself against the charge of “conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.” Indeed, there is no evidence of the alleged prejudice to the best interest of the service.
• In this case, the government’s conduct may appear innocent and nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In the interpretation of a document, such as the Bill of Rights, designed to protect the minority from the majority, the question of which perspective is appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the text, history, structure and values implicated in the interpretation of the clauses, all point toward this perspective. Thus, substantive equality-a reading of the religion clauses which leaves both politically dominant and the politically weak religious groups equal in their inability to use the government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others-makes the most sense in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document designed to protect minorities and individuals from mobocracy in a democracy (the majority or a coalition of minorities).
• As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as the arrangement she had was “illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,”the Solicitor General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
• Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties.Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the test. Other than the two documents offered as cited above which established the sincerity of respondent’s religious belief and the fact that the agreement was an internal arrangement within respondent’s congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In fact, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom.
• Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms – including religious freedom – may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
• IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED.
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* This is a landmark case.
