Fortuitous events, A1174 Civil Code
1. Concept
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a) (CIVIL CODE)
Fortuitous events – refer to “those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.” (CIVIL CODE, Article 1174)
a. Requisites
Requisites of a fortuitous event:
1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the obligor to comply with its obligations was independent of human will;
2) It was impossible to foresee the event or, if it could have been foreseen, to avoid it;
3) The occurrence rendered it impossible for the obligor to fulfill its obligations in a normal manner; and
4) Said obligor was free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. (College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc., G.R. No. 155604, November 22, 2007, Per Austria-Martinez, J.)
1) The cause was independent of human will
For the 1st requisite, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the obligor to comply with its obligations was independent of human will. (College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc. [2007], supra.)
2) Impossibility to foresee or avoid
For the 2nd requisite, it was impossible to foresee the event or, if it could have been foreseen, to avoid it. (College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc. [2007], supra.)
3) Impossible to fulfill obligations in a normal manner
For the 3rd requisite, the occurrence rendered it impossible for the obligor to fulfill its obligations in a normal manner. (College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc. [2007], supra.)
4) No aggravation of the injury or loss from obligor
For the 4th requisite, the obligor should be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. (College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc. [2007], supra.)
If the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof, the fortuitous event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his negligence. (College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc. [2007], supra.)
College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc., G.R. No. 155604, November 22, 2007, Per Austria-Martinez, J.:
• Belfranlt Development, Inc. (respondent) is the owner of Belfranlt Building in Angeles City, Pampanga. It leased to petitioners College Assurance Plan Phil., Inc. (CAP) and Comprehensive Annuity Plans and Pension Corporation (CAPP) several units on the second and third floors of the building.
• On October 8, 1994, fire destroyed portions of the building, including the third floor units being occupied by petitioners. An October 20, 1994 field investigation report by an unnamed arson investigator assigned to the case disclosed:
0.5 Origin of Fire: Store room occupied by CAP, located at the 3rd floor of the bldg.
0.6 Cause of Fire: Accidental (overheated coffee percolator).4
• These findings are reiterated in the October 21, 1994 certification which the BFP City Fire Marshal, Insp. Teodoro D. del Rosario issued to petitioners as supporting document for the latter’s insurance claim.
• Citing the foregoing findings, respondent sent petitioners on November 3, 1994 a notice to vacate the leased premises to make way for repairs, and to pay reparation estimated at P1.5 million.
• [SC RESOLUTION] In the present case, it was fire that caused the damage to the units being occupied by petitioners. The legal presumption therefore is that petitioners were responsible for the damage. Petitioners insist, however, that they are exempt from liability for the fire was a fortuitous event that took place without their fault or negligence.
• The RTC saw differently, holding that the proximate cause of the fire was the fault and negligence of petitioners in using a coffee percolator in the office stockroom on the third floor of the building and in allowing the electrical device to overheat:
Plaintiff has presented credible and preponderant evidence that the fire was not due to a fortuitous event but rather was due to an overheated coffee percolator found in the leased premises occupied by the defendants. The certification issued by the Bureau of Fire Protection Region 3 dated October 21, 1994 clearly indicated that the cause of the fire was an overheated coffee percolator. This documentary evidence is credible because it was issued by a government office which conducted an investigation of the cause and circumstances surrounding the fire of October 8, 1994. Under Section 4, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, there is a legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The defendants have failed to present countervailing evidence to rebut or dispute this presumption. The defendants did not present any credible evidence to impute any wrongdoing or false motives on the part of Fire Department Officials and Arson investigators in the preparation and finalization of this certification. This Court is convinced that the Certification is genuine, authentic, valid and issued in the proper exercise and regular performance of the issuing authority’s official duties. The written certification cannot be considered self-serving to the plaintiff because as clearly indicated on its face the same was issued not to the plaintiff but to the defendant’s representative Mr. Jesus V. Roig for purposes of filing their insurance claim. This certification was issued by a government office upon the request of the defendant’s authorized representative. The plaintiff also presented preponderant evidence that the fire was caused by an overheated coffee percolator when plaintiff submitted in evidence not only photographs of the remnants of a coffee percolator found in the burned premises but the object evidence itself. Defendants did not dispute the authenticity or veracity of these evidence. Defendants merely presented negative evidence in the form of denials that defendants maintained a coffee percolator in the premises testified to by employees of defendants who cannot be considered totally disinterested.21(Citations omitted)
• The CA concurred with the RTC and noted additional evidence of the negligence of petitioners:
The records disclose that the metal base of a heating device which the lower court found to be the base of a coffee percolator, was retrieved from the stockroom where the fire originated. The metal base contains the inscription “CAUTION DO NOT OPERATE WHEN EMPTY”, which is a warning against the use of such electrical device when empty and an indication that it is a water-heating appliance. Its being an instrument for preparing coffee is demonstrated by its retrieval from the stockroom, particularly beside broken drinking glasses, Nescafe bottle, metal dish rack and utensils.
Appellants assert that it had an airpot – not a coffee percolator – near the Administration Office on the third floor. For unexplained reasons, however, they did not present the airpot to disprove the existence of the coffee percolator. The fire did not raze the entire third floor and the objects therein. Even the stack of highly combustible paper on the third floor was not totally gutted by the fire. Consequently, it is not farfetched that the burnt airpot, if any, could have been recovered by appellants from the area where it was supposedly being kept.
x x x x
The defense that the fire was a fortuitous event is untenable. It is undisputed that the fire originated from appellants’ stockroom located on the third floor leased premises. Said stockroom was under the control of appellants which, on that fateful day (a Saturday), conducted a seminar in the training room which was adjoining the stockroom. Absent an explanation from appellants on the cause of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
• We find no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC and CA.
• Even without the testimony of Fireman Sitchon and the documents he prepared, the finding of the RTC and CA on the negligence of petitioners cannot be overturned by petitioners’ bare denial. The CA correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which expert testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and c) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.36 The fire that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of a human act or omission. It originated in the store room which petitioners had possession and control of. Respondent had no hand in the incident. Hence, the convergence of these facts and circumstances speaks for itself: petitioners alone having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to ascertain it, and respondent having no means to find out for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to merely allege that the cause of the fire was the negligence of the former and to rely on the occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence. It was all up to petitioners to dispel such inference of negligence, but their bare denial only left the matter unanswered.
2. The 3 Types
A fortuitous event under Article 1174 may either be:
1) An “act of God” or natural occurrences, or
3) An “act of man.” (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Globe Telecom, Inc., G.R. No. 147324, May 25, 2004, Per Tinga, J.)
a. “Act of God”
Examples:
1) Floods
2) Typhoons
3) Earthquakes
4) Volcanic eruptions
5) Similar natural calamities. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Globe Telecom, Inc. [2004], supra.)
c. “Act of man”
Examples:
1) Riots
2) Strikes
3) Wars
4) Theft or robbery
5) Similar acts of man. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Globe Telecom, Inc. [2004], supra.)
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Globe Telecom, Inc., G.R. No. 147324, May 25, 2004, Per Tinga, J.:
• For several years prior to 1991, Globe Mckay Cable and Radio Corporation, now Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe), had been engaged in the coordination of the provision of various communication facilities for the military bases of the United States of America (US) in Clark Air Base, Angeles, Pampanga and Subic Naval Base in Cubi Point, Zambales. The said communication facilities were installed and configured for the exclusive use of the US Defense Communications Agency (USDCA), and for security reasons, were operated only by its personnel or those of American companies contracted by it to operate said facilities. The USDCA contracted with said American companies, and the latter, in turn, contracted with Globe for the use of the communication facilities. Globe, on the other hand, contracted with local service providers such as the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) for the provision of the communication facilities.
• On 07 May 1991, Philcomsat and Globe entered into an Agreement whereby Philcomsat obligated itself to establish, operate and provide an IBS Standard B earth station (earth station) within Cubi Point for the exclusive use of the USDCA.2 The term of the contract was for 60 months, or five (5) years.3 In turn, Globe promised to pay Philcomsat monthly rentals for each leased circuit involved.4
• At the time of the execution of the Agreement, both parties knew that the Military Bases Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the US (RP-US Military Bases Agreement), which was the basis for the occupancy of the Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in Cubi Point, was to expire in 1991. Under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, foreign military bases, troops or facilities, which include those located at the US Naval Facility in Cubi Point, shall not be allowed in the Philippines unless a new treaty is duly concurred in by the Senate and ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum when the Congress so requires, and such new treaty is recognized as such by the US Government.
• Subsequently, Philcomsat installed and established the earth station at Cubi Point and the USDCA made use of the same.
• On 16 September 1991, the Senate passed and adopted Senate Resolution No. 141, expressing its decision not to concur in the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security and its Supplementary Agreements that was supposed to extend the term of the use by the US of Subic Naval Base, among others.
• On 31 December 1991, the Philippine Government sent a Note Verbale to the US Government through the US Embassy, notifying it of the Philippines’ termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Note Verbale stated that since the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, as amended, shall terminate on 31 December 1992, the withdrawal of all US military forces from Subic Naval Base should be completed by said date.
• In a letter dated 06 August 1992, Globe notified Philcomsat of its intention to discontinue the use of the earth station effective 08 November 1992 in view of the withdrawal of US military personnel from Subic Naval Base after the termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. Globe invoked as basis for the letter of termination Section 8 (Default) of the Agreement, which provides:
Neither party shall be held liable or deemed to be in default for any failure to perform its obligation under this Agreement if such failure results directly or indirectly from force majeure or fortuitous event. Either party is thus precluded from performing its obligation until such force majeure or fortuitous event shall terminate. For the purpose of this paragraph, force majeure shall mean circumstances beyond the control of the party involved including, but not limited to, any law, order, regulation, direction or request of the Government of the Philippines, strikes or other labor difficulties, insurrection riots, national emergencies, war, acts of public enemies, fire, floods, typhoons or other catastrophies or acts of God.
• Philcomsat sent a reply letter dated 10 August 1992 to Globe, stating that “we expect [Globe] to know its commitment to pay the stipulated rentals for the remaining terms of the Agreement even after [Globe] shall have discontinue[d] the use of the earth station after November 08, 1992.” Philcomsat referred to Section 7 of the Agreement, stating as follows:
7. DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE
Should [Globe] decide to discontinue with the use of the earth station after it has been put into operation, a written notice shall be served to PHILCOMSAT at least sixty (60) days prior to the expected date of termination. Notwithstanding the non-use of the earth station, [Globe] shall continue to pay PHILCOMSAT for the rental of the actual number of T1 circuits in use, but in no case shall be less than the first two (2) T1 circuits, for the remaining life of the agreement. However, should PHILCOMSAT make use or sell the earth station subject to this agreement, the obligation of [Globe] to pay the rental for the remaining life of the agreement shall be at such monthly rate as may be agreed upon by the parties.
• After the US military forces left Subic Naval Base, Philcomsat sent Globe a letter dated 24 November 1993 demanding payment of its outstanding obligations under the Agreement amounting to US$4,910,136.00 plus interest and attorney’s fees. However, Globe refused to heed Philcomsat’s demand.
• [SC RESOLUTION] Philcomsat and Globe agreed in Section 8 of the Agreement that the following events shall be deemed events constituting force majeure:
1. Any law, order, regulation, direction or request of the Philippine Government;
2. Strikes or other labor difficulties;
3. Insurrection;
4. Riots;
5. National emergencies;
6. War;
7. Acts of public enemies;
8. Fire, floods, typhoons or other catastrophies or acts of God;
9. Other circumstances beyond the control of the parties.
• Clearly, the foregoing are either unforeseeable, or foreseeable but beyond the control of the parties. There is nothing in the enumeration that runs contrary to, or expands, the concept of a fortuitous event under Article 1174.
• Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, Section 8 of the Agreement which Philcomsat and Globe freely agreed upon has the force of law between them.30
• In order that Globe may be exempt from non-compliance with its obligation to pay rentals under Section 8, the concurrence of the following elements must be established: (1) the event must be independent of the human will; (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
• The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the abovementioned requisites are present in the instant case. Philcomsat and Globe had no control over the non-renewal of the term of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement when the same expired in 1991, because the prerogative to ratify the treaty extending the life thereof belonged to the Senate. Neither did the parties have control over the subsequent withdrawal of the US military forces and personnel from Cubi Point in December 1992.
• The aforementioned events made impossible the continuation of the Agreement until the end of its five-year term without fault on the part of either party. The Court of Appeals was thus correct in ruling that the happening of such fortuitous events rendered Globe exempt from payment of rentals for the remainder of the term of the Agreement.
• Moreover, it would be unjust to require Globe to continue paying rentals even though Philcomsat cannot be compelled to perform its corresponding obligation under the Agreement.
References
• Chapter 2 – Nature and Effects of Obligations, Title I, Book IV, Republic Act No. 386, Civil Code
