Imbecile or insane, A12(1) Revised Penal Code

Imbecile or insane – refers to the exempting circumstance that exempts an accused from criminal liability for committing an offense resulting from being an imbecile or insane person, unless an insane person committed the offnse during a lucid interval.

1. Concept

Imbecile or insane – refers to the exempting circumstance that exempts an accused from criminal liability for committing an offense resulting from being an imbecile or insane person, unless an insane person committed the offnse during a lucid interval.

a. Legal basis

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – the following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

(Revised Penal Code)

b. Legal history

People v. Formigones, En Banc, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950, Per Montemayor, J.:

• The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.

• After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.

c. Effects

1) Admission by the accused

An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted by law. (Sierra v. People, G.R. No. 182941, July 3, 2009, Per Brion, J.)

Strictly speaking, a person acting under any of the exempting circumstances commits a crime but cannot be held criminally liable therefor. The exemption from punishment stems from the complete absence of intelligence or free will in performing the act. (People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017, Per Martires, J.)

The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on this matter must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense/s with which he is charged. (People v. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014, Per Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

2) Burden shifts to accused

As with justifying circumstances, exempting circumstances presupposes that the accused admits to the commission of the offense; however, the accused pleads an exempting circumstance to avoid criminal liability. Thus, the accused has the burden of proof on the applicability the exempting circumstance that is being invoked.

Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused. However, once the defendant admits the commission of the offense charged, but raises an exempting circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. (People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 136844, August 1, 2002, Per Quisumbing, J.)

A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed. (Ambal v. People, supra, citing People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)

An accused interposing the insanity defense admits the commission of the crime which would otherwise engender criminal liability. However, the accused pleas for acquittal due to lack of freedom, intelligence, or malice. In doing so, the defense must prove insanity. However, the shift of burden from the prosecution to defense does not necessarily mean shifting the same quantum of evidence because the allegation sought to be proven are different. (People v. Paña, En Banc, G.R. No. 214444, November 17, 2020, Per Leonen, J.)

d. Test

Tests in determining the existence of legal insanity:

1) The test of cognition; and

2) The test of volition. (People v. Paña, supra. People v. Formigones, supra.)

The test of cognition requires a “complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act” while the test of volition requires a “total deprivation of freedom of the will.” Despite the existence of these standards by which legal insanity can be measured, a review of jurisprudence shows more reliance on the test of cognition. (People v. Paña, supra.)

A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests (a) the test of cognition – “complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act,” and (b) the test of volition – “or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.” But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to “freedom of the will;” examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of “freedom of the will,” i.e., without an accompanying “complete deprivation of intelligence.” This is perhaps to be expected since a person’s volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: “Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.” (People v. Rafanan, Jr., G.R. No. L-54135, November 21, 1991, Per Feliciano, J.)

Since Formigones, the standard on insanity defense cases has remained the same and a low rate of acceptance of insanity persisted in our jurisdiction. The test is stringent because it requires complete deprivation of reason and intelligence. Any indication of cognition or reason before, during, or after the commission of the crime leads to a rejection of the defense. Rarely does complete deprivation of cognition get proven in court. In fact, a survey of jurisprudence shows that only two cases passed this strict standard. (People v. Paña, supra.)

People v. Paña, En Banc, G.R. No. 214444, November 17, 2020, Per Leonen, J.:

• In the 1996 case of People v. Austria, it was alleged that the accused suffered from paranoid type schizophrenia, which is characterized by “unpredictable assaultiveness” and “violent and destructive behavior,” among others. According to psychiatric evaluation, his auditory hallucinations recurred and he was experiencing a relapse. A week later, he allegedly had the sudden urge to have sexual intercourse with the victim after being intoxicated by 10 bottles of beer. He then went to the victim’s house and when she refused to have intercourse with him, he claimed to hear the devil ordering him to stab the victim and her children. During trial, the psychiatrist testified that the accused had previously been confined and that his mental condition cannot be cured by medication.

• In acquitting the accused, this Court held that there was sufficient evidence showing that he was insane at the time he committed the crime. The Court gave weight to the fact of his previous confinement, his erratic behavior prior to the incident, and the psychiatrist’s testimony which confirmed that he was having a relapse, completely depriving him of reason at the time of the incident.

• In the more recent case of Verdadero v. People, decided in 2016, this Court acquitted the accused based on the testimony of his psychiatrist, who categorically claimed that the accused was diagnosed with schizophrenia. The psychiatrist further testified that the accused had several relapses in the past and, again, at the time of the stabbing incident. This was consistent with the testimony of the accused’s neighbor who narrated that the accused was of unsound mind, noting that on the day of the incident he had reddish eyes and appeared drunk.

• In Verdadero, while there was no direct evidence showing the accused’s mental state at the precise moment of the incident, this Court held that insanity was sufficiently proven by the circumstances immediately before and after the incident. Considering the expert testimony which is corroborated by another witness, this Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence showing that the accused was deprived of intelligence at the time of the commission of the offense.

• Save for Austria and Verdadero, schizophrenia, which has often been cited to support a claim of insanity, has usually never passed the test of cognition in Formigones. This is because schizophrenia is not automatically accompanied by loss of intelligence.

2. Imbecile or insane person

This person is exempt from criminal liability: Imbecile or an insane person. (REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 12[1])

Imbecility

According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an insane person is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder. (Ambal v. People, G.R. No. L-52688, October 17, 1980, Per Aquino, J., citing 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)

Imbecility, one of the exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, is defined as feeblemindedness or a mental condition approaching that of one who is insane. It is analogous to childishness and dotage. An imbecile, within the meaning of Article 12, is one who must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. He is one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of children between two and seven years of age. (People v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997, Per Romero, J.)

[F]or an accused to be regarded as an imbecile within the contemplation of the Revised Penal Code, there must be complete deprivation of reason, discernment, or freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime. (People v. Paña, En Banc, G.R. No. 214444, November 17, 2020, Per Leonen, J.)

Imbecility, like insanity, is a defense which pertains to the mental condition of a person. Our case law projects the same standards in respect of both insanity and imbecility, that is, that the insanity or imbecility must constitute complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act, or total deprivation of freedom of the will. (People v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 93752, July 15, 1992, Per Feliciano, J.)

People v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997, Per Romero, J.:

• Accused-appellant’s act of cutting grass rather than guarding his victim could hardly be indicative of imbecility. Rather, it may be considered as negligence but definitely not childishness or even that of one completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of the will. In fact, accused-appellant admitted on cross-examination that he can tell what is right and what is wrong. Assuming arguendo that accused-appellant is an imbecile or a feebleminded person, in the case of People v. Formigones, it was held that feeblemindedness is not exempting, because the offender could distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile or an insane cannot. In any case, Article 800 of the Civil Code provides that “the law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.” The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Moreover, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously.

Insanity

In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future. (People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, May 12, 2000, Per Puno, J.)

Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus, in order to lend credence to a defense of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts. (People v. Umawid, supra.)

In People v. Florendo, the Court held that “the prevalent meaning of the word ‘crazy’ is not synonymous with the legal terms ‘insane,’ ‘non compos mentis,’ ‘unsound mind,’ ‘idiot,’ or ‘lunatic.’ The popular conception of the word ‘crazy’ is being used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.’ Not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. (People v. Pantoja, citing People v. Florendo, En Banc, G.R. No. 136845, October 8, 2003, Per Bellosillo, J.)

[The Supreme Court defines insanity as] … a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition. (People v. Paña, supra.)

a. Elements

Elements for insanity as an exempting circumstance:

1) That defendant’s insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and

2) That such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime. (People v. Pantoja, supra.)

Element 1: Complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment

Complete deprivation of intelligence has been equated to “defect of the understanding” such that the accused must have “no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of [their] acts.” Deprivation of intelligence, however, is not a symptom of every mental illness. (People v. Paña, supra.)

Feeblemindedness has also been rejected by this Court as sufficient basis to support a claim of insanity. In Formigones, the accused was not deemed insane as he was not completely deprived of reason at the time he committed the offense and could still distinguish right from wrong. Even his past conduct did not indicate that he was mentally ill. (People v. Paña, supra.)

a) Origins

The complete deprivation of intelligence or will test originated from the old English concept of “wild beast test,” which likens defendants to wild beasts due to their “complete lack of understanding” of their actions. English jurisprudence held that to be insane, an accused “must be totally deprived of his understanding and memory so as not to know what he is doing, no more than an infant, brute or a wild beast.” This test placed more emphasis on the accused’s cognitive capacity rather than impulses, and raised the criteria which effectively reduced the rate of acquittal in insanity defense cases. (People v. Paña, supra.)

NB: Jurisprudence has recognized various tests applied in other jurisdictions, such as the M’Naghten Rule, Durham Product Test, Substantial Capacity Test (otherwise known as the American Law Institute (ALI) Standard), etc.

In our jurisdiction, the more stringent test formed in Formigones remained the standard in determining insanity. Nevertheless, tests other than the formulation in Formigones are suppletorily used by this Court to determine whether there was complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the crime. (People v. Paña, supra.)

In a number of cases, this Court resolved insanity cases by ascertaining whether the accused was aware of their acts’ wrongfulness. For instance, immediate surrender to the authorities, escaping arrest, display of remorse, and threatening the victim to avoid getting caught101 have been considered proof that the accused knew the nature and culpability of their acts. (People v. Paña, supra.)

b) Question of fact

In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted committing the crime. This Court had also consistently ruled that for the plea of insanity to prosper, the accused must present clear and convincing evidence to support the claim. (People v. Roa, G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017, Per Velasco, Jr., J.)

Insanity relates to a person’s state of mind. However, a person’s motivations, thoughts, and emotions are only manifested through overt acts.107 Courts, therefore, can only consider evidence relating to the behavioral patterns of the accused to determine whether they are legally insane. (People v. Paña, supra.)

c) Burden of proof

Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a successful defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of an accused’s insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. (People v. Roa, supra.)

d) Quantum of proof: clear and convincing evidence

Verily, insanity is not an element of the crime that should be demonstrated with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The defense only bears the burden of disputing the presumption of sanity. Ultimately, the defense must proffer evidence of insanity sufficient to overcome the presumption. This quantum of evidence is not necessarily proof beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Roa, supra.)

Moreover, proof of defense, mitigation, excuse, or justification in criminal cases need not be proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Roa, supra.)

In criminal cases involving pleas in the nature of confession and avoidance, clear and convincing evidence is sufficient to acquit the accused. For instance, defendants interposing self-defense are only required to demonstrate self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. In cases where the justifying circumstance of defense of strangers is invoked, this Court likewise only requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. The same quantum of evidence applies to cases where the defense of state of necessity is invoked. Likewise, proof of other exempting circumstances only requires clear and convincing evidence. (People v. Roa, supra.)

e) Kinds of proof

Since no man can know what goes on in the mind of another, one’s behavior and outward acts can only be determined and judged by proof. Such proof may take the form of opinion testimony by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness’ own perception of the accused; or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. (People v. Pantoja, supra.)

For purposes of exemption from criminal liability, mere behavioral oddities cannot support a finding of insanity unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a total absence of reason, discernment, or free will at the time the crime was committed. (People v. Pantoja, supra.)

Element 2: Insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime

Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed. (People v. Floreno, supra.)

A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed (People v. Ambal, supra, People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)

The complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifested at the time “preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.” Thus, courts admit evidence or proof of insanity which relate to the time immediately before, during, or after the commission of the offense. (People v. Paña, supra.)

Because our current rule requires complete deprivation of intelligence, the slightest sign of reason before, during, or after the commission of the crime instantly overthrows the insanity defense. (People v. Paña, supra.)

People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, May 12, 2000, Per Puno, J.:

• None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Hence the importance of adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense. Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.

• In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion. Neither is the appellant’s seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the appellant’s unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest reason.

People v. Florendo, En Banc, G.R. No. 136845, October 8, 2003, Per Bellosillo, J.:

• The medical findings of the BGHMC, which diagnosed appellants mental disorder as schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type, refer to appellants treatment after the incident happened. It is bereft of any proof that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time or at the very moment he killed his wife. It is inconclusive as to whether he was insane at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the killing.

• In compliance with this Courts Resolution of 15 August 2000, an evaluation of the psychological and psychiatric condition of appellant was conducted by the Supreme Court Clinic Services at the National Penitentiary on 22 August 2000. The neuro-psychiatric evaluation report disclosed that appellant was suffering from psychosis or insanity, classified as chronic schizophrenia, paranoid type. It divulged further that prior to the onset of the overt psychotic symptoms, appellant manifested unusual behavior prior to the commission of the crime of parricide described as fearfulness, irritability, suspiciousness and jealousy or preoccupation with the fidelity of his wife. In retrospect, this group of symptoms could have possibly been the prodromal phase heralding the onset of the psychotic illness. The report revealed that symptoms of appellants mental illness were conceivably manifested prior to the date of the crime and that substantial evidence was lacking to conclude that his abnormal behavior was due to the use of drugs or any prohibited substance.

• As can be gleaned from the reports, appellant could only be undergoing the percursory stages of a disease prior to and at the time of the killing. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming that he had some form of mental illness by virtue of the premonitory symptoms of schizophrenia, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate certain matters such as his jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime. While appellant on many occasions before the commission of the crime did things that would indicate that he was not of sound mind, such acts only tended to show that he was in an abnormal mental state and not necessarily of unsound mind that would exempt him from criminal liability. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The odd or bizarre behavior of appellant prior to the commission of the crime as described by the prosecution witnesses, if anything else, did not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. If the defense of insanity is sustained, the floodgates to abuse will be opened by the cunning and ingenious public. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not prove insanity.

References

• Title I – Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability, Book I, Act No. 3815, Revised Penal Code

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/Updated: August 26, 2023