Marriages Exempted from License: T1C2, A27-34 Family Code

1. Concept

1) Under the Family Code, Chapter 2 provides for exceptional marriages, i.e., marriages that do not need a license (See Ado-An-Morimoto v. Morimoto, G.R. No. 247576, 15 March 2021, Per Leonen, J.). On the other hand, under the Civil Code, it is known as marriages of exceptional character under the Civil Code (Diaz-Salgado v. Salgado, G.R. No. 204494, 27 July 2016, Per Reyes, J.)

Family Code	Civil Code
1) Articulo mortis (point of death)	1) Articulo mortis during peace or war
2) Remote residences	2) Remote places
3) Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities	3) Consular marriages
4) 5-year cohabitation without legal impediment to marry	4) Ratification of marital cohabitation
	5) Religious ratification of a civil marriage
	6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages
	7) Mixed marriages

Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, Per Ynares-Santiago, J.:

• Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.

• In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Vda. De Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 135216, 19 August 1999, Per Panganiban, J.:

• Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.10 An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

2) Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. (Dayot v. Tecson-Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, 28 March 2008, Per Chico-Nazario, J.)

Dayot v. Tecson-Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, 28 March 2008, Per Chico-Nazario, J.:

• A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

• It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.

a. Strict interpretation

2) Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. (Republic v. Tecson-Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, 28 March 2008, Per Chico-Nazario, J.)

Republic v. Tecson-Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, 28 March 2008, Per Chico-Nazario, J.:

• For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 [of the Civil Code] to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

• It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.