Proof of Filiation, A172 Family Code
1. Proof of Filiation
a. Primary
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. x x x
1) Birth certificate
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; x x x
Related provisions:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births.-The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f) and such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the same shall report to the local civil registrar the place, date, and hour of finding and other attendant circumstances.
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified. (ACT NO. 3753, Civil Register Law)
A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such public document. This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The evidentiary nature of such document must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. (Heirs of Cabais v. CA, G.R. Nos. 106314-15, October 8, 1999, Per Purisima, J.)
Ara v. Pizarro, G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017, Per Leonen, J.:
• True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation. To overthrow the presumption of truth contained in a birth certificate, a high degree of proof is needed. However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent us from according it the same weight as any other birth certificate.
• A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the putative parent, is tenuous proof of filiation.
• Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia’s delayed registration of birth the same evidentiary weight as regular birth certificates.
• Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, filiation may still be established after the death of a putative parent through an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent concerned. However, petitioners did not present in evidence any admissions of filiation.
• The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with Josefa and petitioners’ relatives, and testimonies do not show that Josefa is their mother. They do not contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less ones pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia’s Baptismal Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late registration all state that Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act, declaration, or omission on the part of Josefa. Josefa did not participate in making any of them. The same may be said of the testimonies presented. Although Josefa may have been in the photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. By definition, none of the evidence presented constitutes an admission of filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code.
See: Original Decision
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, Per Villarama, Jr., J.:
• [I]n the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring respondent as a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad is one based on a misapprehension of facts.
• A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of the informant -Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court still relied on the prima facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for failure of petitioner to explain how the erasures were done and if the alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the birth certificate…
• The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate…
See: Original Decision
2) Signed acknowledgement
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
x x x
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. x x x
a) Love letters
Lim v. CA, G.R. No. 112229, March 18, 1997, Per Romero, J.:
• The evidence in the instant case shows that petitioner considered himself to be the father of Joanna Rose as shown by the hand-written letter he wrote to Maribel:
“Hi Love,
I wrote you this letter because I would like to erase from your mind the thought of why I can not ever [sic] you marriage right now is because I have no longer love or care for both Joanna & you.
Last night when we talked things over, I was in a stage wherein everything was happening so fast that I was running out of time & works (sic) to make you understand me through this letter I would like to explain my side in a more detailed way and I hope you could understand.
You know love, the main root of the problem of why marriage is impossible for us right now is not what my parents or my family circle will say about you, but the financial side of it. Okay, let say I did marry you right now disregarding my financial stability. Sooner or later they will come to know of it and I am sure that they will not consent it. I have no alternative but to leave them & to stick it up with you. This is where the financial side comes in. I can’t allow myself walking away from my family making them think that I can stand on my own two feet but the truth of the matter is not and seeing both of you suffer for only one stupid mistake which is I was not yet financially ready to face the consequence.
My plan is that if you could only stick it out with me until I am ready to face whatever consequence that might occur during our life or relation as husband and wife. You have already tried it before, why can’t you stress it a little longer. In return, I promise to be a loving & caring husband & father to both of you.
Love, I really don’t want you to be taken away from me by anyone, whether he be single or married. This is the reason why I am still trying to convince you. But if you really have decided things up and really determined to push through with it. I guess I just have to respect your decision. Just remember I wish you the best of luck and take extra-care of yourself & Joanna.
Remember, if the time comes when things get rough for you and you have no one to turn to, don’t hesitate to call on me. I am very much willing to be at your side to help you. I love you very much! Miso
Love,
Raymond” (Underscoring supplied by Raymond himself)
• From the tenor of the letter and the statements petitioner made therein it is clear that, contrary to his vehement assertion that he and Maribel were just friends, they were actually lovers.
In an earlier letter, this time sent to Maribel while she was in Japan, petitioner lovingly told her to take care of herself because of her “situation,” obviously referring to the state of pregnancy of Maribel:
“Aug. 11, 1981
Hi Love,
Do you know how glad I was to receive a letter from you yesterday? At least now I’m a little bit at ease to know that everything is fine with you.
Love, in your letter you seem so much concern (sic) about my situation once here. I really appreciate it, but please don’t give too much thought about it because I’m physically o.k. here. The important thing is that don’t think too much and have a lot of rest during your spare time especially in the situation you’re in now. If you are feeling homesick just go out with your friends and try to enjoy yourself to the fullest while you are there
Love, you said in your letter that you regret very much your going there & wishes (sic) that you have not left anymore. I understand your feelings to what had happened after you told me about it in the telephone.
xxx xxx xxx
Love, I miss you so much that I always re-read those letters you had send me very often. At night I always think of you and the times we’re together before going to sleep.
xxx xxx xxx” (Underscoring supplied)
• It was only after petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny paternity of Joanna Rose. Until he got married to another woman, he did not object to being identified as Joanna Rose’s father as disclosed in the Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record reveals that he even got a copy of the said Certificate when Joanna Rose started schooling, as shown by a receipt in his name from the San Juan Municipal Office. His belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the father of Joanna Rose.
• Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.
See: Original Decision
b. Secondary
Art. 172. x x x
x x x
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
1) Open and continuous status
2) Rules of Court or Special Laws
Heirs of Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario v. CA, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998, Per Bellosillo, J.:
• Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of filiation because: (a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do not prove filiation; (b) certifications on non-availability of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do not prove filiation of alleged collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged daughter of Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of Josefina and Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia was made to testify on events which happened before her birth while Adelaida testified on matters merely narrated to her.
• We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted are competent and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private respondents assert that they are co-owners of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share of the subject property by way of legal or intestate succession.
• Under Art. 172 of the Family Code,the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.
• Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country.The baptismal certificates presented in evidence by private respondents are public documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries contained therein.
• The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera …, thus –
x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during the course of its business.
• It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.
• Petitioners’ objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was properly discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself except when the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the original certificate of birth of Manuel J. Sampayo was duly established by the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City to the effect that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a consequence thereof, all civil registration records were totally burned.
• Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners’ contention that the testimony of Adelaida Sampayo cannot prove filiation for being hearsay considering that there was no declaration ante litem motam as required by the rules, i.e., that the declaration relating to pedigree was made before the controversy occurred. Nonetheless, petitioners made no move to dispute her testimony in open court when she was mentioning who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes were. As correctly observed by the trial court in explicit terms, “the documentary and testimonial evidence were not disputed by defendants” (now petitioners).Notably, when Rosario Cuario Conti took the witness stand, she admitted that she was not aware of the identities of the parents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs counter to the relationship akin to filial bonding which she professed she had enjoyed with the decedent. As wife of Ignacio Conti, she was supposedly a “sister-in-law” of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who regarded Ignacio as a brother. However, in sum, we rule that all the pieces of evidence adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to the right of private respondents to maintain the action for partition.
See: Original Decision
c. Scientific proof: DNA, etc.
Sec. 9. of DNA Testing Results. – In evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider the following:
a. The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of mismatching DNA evidence;
b. The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence presented in the case; and that
c. DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, October 2, 2007)
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity and filiation.Under the Rule on DNA Evidence, among the purposes of DNA testing is to determine whether two or more distinct biological samples originate from related persons, known as kinship analysis.The Rule on DNA Evidence permits the use of any biological sample, including bones,in DNA testing. This Court has sanctioned the exhumation of bodies for DNA testing. (Aquino v. Aquino, En Banc, G.R. No. 209018, December 7, 2021, Per Leonen, J.)
[W]hile the Rule on DNA Evidence refers specifically to DNA testing as probability of parentage involving a putative father,it does not prohibit the use of kinship analysis through DNA testing of other genetically related persons, when there is prima facie evidence or reasonable possibilityof genetic kinship. Thus, in the absence of viable biological samples of the putative father, DNA testing may be used as corroborative evidenceof two or more persons’ exclusion or inclusion in the same genetic lineage, subject to scientific analysis of the likelihood of relatedness of those persons based on the results of the tests. This is in keeping with the liberalization of the rule on investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, in the paramount consideration of the child’s welfare and best interest of the child. (Aquino v. Aquino [2021], supra.)
Santiago v. Jornacion, G.R. No. 230049, October 6, 2021, Per Carandang, J.:
• Alongside Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code in establishing filiation of illegitimate children, We held that “with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio (Ong) is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.”
• To be clear, while scientific proof is allowed to impugn legitimacy under Article 166(2) of the Family Code, the same type of proof should also be allowed to establish filiation under Article 175 in relation to Article 172, paragraph 2(2) – i.e., any other means allowed by the Rules of Court. One of these means is through the use of DNA evidence under A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC.
See: Original Decision
2. Miscellaneous
a. Other documents
1) Unsigned birth certificates
Perla v. Baring, G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012, Per Del Castillo, J.:
• Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.It is settled that “[a] certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.”We also cannot lend credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness stand.
See: Original Decision
2) Testimonial evidence
Perla v. Baring, G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012, Per Del Castillo, J.:
• Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio “Papa” and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place, cannot be considered as indications of Randy’s open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1). “[T]o prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.”Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, “[t]he father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist.”Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.Neither can Antonio’s paternity be deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelita’s actuations could have been done due to charity or some other reasons.
• This Court cannot likewise agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Antonio fathered Randy merely on the basis of his admission that he had sexual encounters with Mirasol. Neither does it agree with the CA that the inconsistencies in Antonio’s testimony with regard to the number of times he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol are good reasons to disregard his denials and uphold the respondents’ claims. It is well to stress that as plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio is the father of her son Randy.She must rely on the strength of her evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.As Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was incumbent upon Mirasol to prove that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or nine months before the birth of Randy. This crucial period therefore is during the early part of the first quarter of 1983. However, nothing from Mirasol’s testimony indicates that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time. She merely testified that she last met with Antonio in 1983 but could not remember the particular month.Plainly, this hardly means anything not only because it was not established that the said meeting took place during that crucial period but also because Mirasol never mentioned that they had sexual contact during their meeting.
• Antonio’s admission of sexual intercourse with Mirasol does not likewise by any means strengthen respondents’ theory that he fathered Randy. When Antonio testified as an adverse witness for the respondents, he stated that he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol in February and August of 1981. Later testifying as witness for his own behalf, he mentioned that he had a one night affair with Mirasol which happened in the month of September or October of 1981. Assuming that he indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol on the dates mentioned, still, none of these sexual congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later in 1983.
See: Original Decision
3) Baptismal certificates
Alejandra Arado Heirs v. Alcoran, G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015, Per Bersamin, J.:
• Anacleto’s baptismal certificate… was of no consequence in determining his filiation. We have already held in Cabatania v. Court of Appeals that “while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity;” and that baptismal certificates were “per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation,” and thus “cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation].” Hence, we attach no probative value to the baptismal certificate as proof of the filiation of Anacleto.
See: Original Decision
Perla v. Baring, G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012, Per Del Castillo, J.:
• Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity.And “while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.”
See: Original Decision
4) Family photos
Alejandra Arado Heirs v. Alcoran, G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015, Per Bersamin, J.:
• The weight accorded by the RTC and the CA to the picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas… was also undeserved. At best, the picture merely manifested that it was Joaquina who had acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto. Cautioning against the admission in evidence of a picture of similar nature, we have pointed out in Solinap v. Locsin, Jr.that:
[R]espondent’s photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
See: Original Decision
5) School records
Alejandra Arado Heirs v. Alcoran, G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015, Per Bersamin, J.:
• The school records of Anacleto…, which evinced that Joaquina was the guardian of Anacleto in his grade school years, and the marriage contract between Anacleto and Elenette…, which indicated that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto’s marriage, did not have the evidentiary value accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina’s apparent recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for, as we stressed in Cenido v. Apacionado,the recognition “must be made personally by the parent himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock.”
See: Original Decision
6) Other Government records
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015, Per Villarama, Jr., J.:
• [W]e also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative parents because she was allowed to bear their family name “Geronimo”, they supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his legal heirs.
• In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romnaldo Villanueva which incisively discussed its parallelisms and contrasts with the case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,we ruled that the presence of a similar set of circumstances – which were relied upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at bar – does not establish that one is,a child of the putative parents. Our discussion in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:
• In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that she had been reared and continuously treated as Vicente’s daughter.
• By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua’s alleged parents had been unable to beget children, the siblings of Benitez-Badua’s supposed father were able to rebut all of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was counted against Benitez-Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
• Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document, (emphasis ours)
• Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
• There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua that are simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been born after their alleged parents had lived together childless for several years.
• There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales’ daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua’s alleged mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales’ estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.
See: Original Decision
