Right to Bail, Bill of Rights A3S13 1987 Constitution
1. Concept
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Related provisions:
Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a) (Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Section 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail. — No person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. (3a) (Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognize as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, , or life imprisonment. (4a) (Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Section 6. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and of the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. (6a) (Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a) (Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained but “whose guilt has not yet been proven” in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. (People v. Escobar, G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017, Per Leonen, J.)
a. Purpose
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,or whenever so required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. (Yap, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, Per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.)
Yap, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, Per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:
• To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
• At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioner’s submission that bail in the instant case be set at P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29, 2000, maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa where the amount of fraud is P142,000.00 or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal). True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for the guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts, “merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the enforcement of criminal laws.”Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal justice.This notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in petitioner’s case an amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances.
2. Constitutional right
[A]ny person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Thus, from the moment an accused is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Padua v. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019, Per Peralta, J.)
1) Flows from presumption of innocence
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong.5 Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a “mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused” for the subsequent trial.Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted. (Camara v. Enage, En Banc, G.R. Nos. L-32951, September 17, 1971, Per Fernando, J.)
3. When not a right
Bail is not longer a matter of right, if:
1) The offense charged carries a penalty of either death, , or life imprisonment; and
2) Evidence of guilt is strong.
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable by death, or life imprisonment” before conviction by the Regional Trial Court. However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, , or life imprisonment-“regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution”-and when evidence of one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court. (Padua v. People, supra.)
Padua v. People, G.R. No. 220913, February 4, 2019, Per Peralta, J.:
• In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, reduced to . Escobar’s bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
a. Reclusion perpetua
b. Evidence of guilt is strong
[I]n cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the judge. The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. “The court’s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution on the basis of which should be formulated the judge’s own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.” (People v. Sobrepeña, G.R. No. 204063, December 5, 2016, Per Del Castillo, J.)
Recto v. People, G.R. No. 236461, December 5, 2018, Per Caguioa, J.:
• [A]s a rule, all persons charged with a criminal offense have the right to bail. However, persons charged with an offense punishable by cannot avail of this right if the evidence of guilt is strong.
• In the present case, Recto was charged with Murder – an offense punishable by. Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers or jurisdiction when it denied Recto’s initial Petition for Bail. The RTC possesses sufficient discretion to determine, based on the evidence presented before it during the bail hearing, whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
• However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion to Fix Bail on the ground that bail had become a matter of right as the evidence presented by the prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not Murder. This Motion to Fix Bail was denied by the RTC, reiterating its earlier finding that, in its judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong. This is where the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, and the CA thus erred in upholding the RTC’s Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail.
• As correctly pointed out by Recto, the evidence of the prosecution could, at best, only convict him of Homicide and not Murder…
• In the case of Bernardez v. Valera, the Court emphasized that the “evidence of guilt is strong” standard should be applied in relation to the crime as charged. Thus:
While the charge against petitioner is undeniably a capital offense, it seems likewise obvious that the evidence submitted by the prosecution to the respondent judge for the purpose of showing that the evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong, is not sufficient to establish that the offense committed by petitioner, if any, was that of murder. On the basis of the sworn statement of Benedito himself petitioner could only be held liable for homicide. It must be observed in this connection that a person charged with a criminal offense will not be entitled to bail even before conviction only if the charge against him is a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt of said offense is strong. In the present case, as already stated, the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its opposition to the motion for bail could prove, at most, homicide and not murder, because it does not sufficiently prove either known premeditation or alevosia.
• In People v. Plaza, the accused also filed a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. After a finding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery could not be appreciated in the case, the accused also filed a motion to fix bail. The RTC granted the motion, and its validity was upheld by the CA. Upon appeal to the Court, it likewise upheld the grant of bail, ratiocinating that the grant of bail to an accused charged with a capital offense depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
• Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, the RTC should have determined whether the evidence of guilt is strong for Murder, as opposed to simply determining if the evidence that he was responsible for Carlosita’s death was strong. As previously illustrated above, the evidence of Recto’s guilt – for Murder – was not strong. In sum, the RTC should have granted Recto’s Motion to Fix Bail.
4. When discretionary
a. Upon conviction
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, , or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (5a) (Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. (Qui v. People, G.R. No. 196161, September 26, 2012, Per Velasco, J.)
For a human being who has been inside a prison cell, a bail bond represents his only ticket to liberty, albeit provisional. But the right to bail is not always a demandable right. In certain instances, it is a matter of discretion. This discretion, however, is not full and unfettered because the law and the rules set the parameters for its proper exercise. Discretion is, of course, a delicate thing and its abuse of such grave nature would warrant intervention of this Court by way of the special civil action for certiorari. (Maguddatu v. CA, G.R. No. 139599, February 23, 2000, Per Kapunan, J.)
b. On Appeal
Yap v. CA, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, Per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:
• It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal is non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years and circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled.In the same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact convicted by the trial court.In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Francisco’s disquisition on why bail should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion; thus:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.xxx
• Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years –the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
Qui v. People, G.R. No. 196161, September 26, 2012, Per Velasco, J.:
• Petitioner’s plea for bail pending appeal is bereft of merit.
• The CA properly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. The CA’s determination as to petitioner being a high risk for flight is not without factual mooring. Indeed, the undisputed fact that petitioner did not attend the hearings before the RTC, which compelled the trial court to issue warrants for her arrest, is undeniably indicative of petitioner’s propensity to trifle with court processes. This fact alone should weigh heavily against a grant of bail pending appeal.
• Petitioner’s penchant to disobey court processes may also be deduced from the fact that she lied in order to wiggle out of, and justify her non-appearance on the March 8, 2010 hearing before the RTC. Petitioner gave the convenient but false excuse that her father, Cirilo Calpito, was hospitalized on said hearing day (i.e., March 8, 2010) and that Cirilo died on March 24, 2010. The lies foisted on the court were exposed by: (1) the Death Certificate of Cirilo Calpito clearly showing that he died on March 24, 2009 or a year before the aforesaid March 2010 RTC hearing; and (2) the Certification issued by Dr. Aniana Javier stating that Cirilo went to her clinic on March 9, 2009.
• Lest it be overlooked, the RTC notice sent to petitioner’s bonding company was returned with the notation “moved out,” while the notice sent to petitioner’s given address was returned unclaimed with the notation “RTS no such person according to Hesita Family” who were the actual occupants in petitioner’s given address. The fact of transferring residences without informing her bondsman and the trial court can only be viewed as petitioner’s inclination to evade court appearance, as indicative of flight, and an attempt to place herself beyond the pale of the law.
• Petitioner’s argument that she has the constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of guilt against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court, the presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends. As to the strength of evidence of guilt against her, suffice it to say that what is before the Court is not the appeal of her conviction, let alone the matter of evaluating the weight of the evidence adduced against her.
• Consequently, the Court agrees with the appellate court’s finding of the presence of the fourth circumstance enumerated in the above-quoted Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and holds that the appellate court neither erred nor gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. The appellate court appeared to have been guided by the circumstances provided under the Rules. As the Court categorically held in People v. Fitzgerald, “As for an accused already convicted and sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the. circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e) x x x.” Evidently, the circumstances succinctly provided in Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure have been placed as a guide for the exercise of the appellate court’s discretion in granting or denying the application for bail, pending the appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a crime where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years.
5. Miscellaneous
a. Excessive bail
Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. — The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a)
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano,this Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions. (Yap, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, Per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.)
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. (Camara v. Enage, supra.)
Camara v. Enage, En Banc, G.R. Nos. L-32951, September 17, 1971, Per Fernando, J.:
• An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail.1 The merit of the petition on its face is thus apparent.
• Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
• No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resists thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, “a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper’s will.”It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left resentment and bitterness in its wake. Petitioner’s subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent Judge did, however, does call for repudiation from this Court.
b. Jumping bail
Sy Guan v. Amparo, En Banc, G.R. No. L-1771, December 4, 1947, Per Tuason, J.:
• The petitioner denies that he fled or avoided going to trial. He alleges misunderstanding on his part and change of address as the cause of his non-appearance. The point is unimportant. Assuming for the sake of this case that the petitioner purposely “jumped” his bail, that facts does not operate as a forfeiture of his right to temporary liberty. Except where bail is a matter of right, irrespective of such circumstance the breach of a prior bond is a compelling reason for the refusal of bail in the same cause. But where bail is a matter of right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. (8 C.J.S., 77; Rowan vs. Randolph, 268 Fed., 527.)
• Bail before conviction is a constitutional right of an accused, except in prosecutions for capital offenses where the proof of guilt is strong. (Article III, section 1, paragraph 16, Philippine Constitution.) Other than this, the Constitution makes no exceptions. The existence of high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to intend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision of the same section and paragraph cited, that excessive bail shall not be required.”
c. Violating conditions of bail
Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court of these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount of the undertaking and the conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail. (2a) (Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Maguddatu v. CA, G.R. No. 139599, February 23, 2000, Per Kapunan, J.:
• Pursuant to the same Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be admitted to bail upon the court’s discretion after conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, or life imprisonment. However, such bail shall be denied or bail previously granted shall be cancelled if the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years if any one of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5 is present.
• From the records of the case, petitioners are not entitled to bail. Firstly, petitioners violated the conditions of their bail. Bail is defined as a security for the release of a person conditioned upon his appearance before any court. The accused shall also appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules. Petitioners’ non-appearance during the promulgation of the trial court’s decision despite due notice and without justifiable reason, and their continued non-submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the Court of Appeals, constitute violations of the conditions of their bail. Moreover, it appears that petitioners failed to renew their expired bail bond, as shown by a Motion, dated January 06, 1987, filed by AFISCO Insurance Corporation, praying for the cancellation of petitioners’ bail bond because of the latter’s failure to renew the same upon its expiration.
