Self-defense, A11(1) Revised Penal Code
1. Concept
Self-defense – refers to a justifying circumstance wherein no criminal liability results for a crime committed by an accused who acted in self-defending.
Read more: Justifying circumstances
a. Legal basis
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
(Revised Penal Code)
2. Self-defense
Self-defense is one of the justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
a. Requisites
Essential requisites of self-defense:
1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. (Belbis, Jr. v. Brucales, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012, Per Peralta, J.)
A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon another person – a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal Code. However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his or her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor. (Velasquez v. People, G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017, Per Leonen, J.)
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. (Belbis, Jr. v. Brucales, supra.)
Element 1: Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
The first requisite – unlawful aggression – is the condition sine qua non of self-defense and defense of a relative. (Velasquez v. People, supra.)
Unlawful aggression – refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense. (People v. Caratao, G.R. No. 126281, June 10, 2003, Per Azcuna, J.)
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. (People v. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011, Per Bersamin, J.)
At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression committed against [the Accused]. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present. (People v. Caratao, supra.)
Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support the theory of self-defense and the complete or incomplete exemption from criminal liability; without such primal requisite it is not possible to maintain that a person acted in self-defense within the terms under which unlawful aggression is subordinate to the other two conditions… When an act of aggression is in response to an insult, affront, or threat, it cannot be considered as a defense but as the punishment which the injured party inflicts on the author of the provocation, and in such a case the courts can at most consider it as a mitigating circumstance, but never as a reason for exemption, except in violation of the provisions of the Penal Code. (U.S. v. Carrero, En Banc, G.R. No. L-3956, January 10, 1908, Per Torres, J.)
a) Test of unlawful aggression
The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. (People v. Nugas, supra.)
b) Elements of unlawful aggression
[T]he accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely:
1) There must be a physical or material attack or assault;
2) The attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and
3) The attack or assault must be unlawful. (People v. Nugas, supra.)
c) Kinds of unlawful aggression
2 Kinds of unlawful aggression:
1) Actual or material unlawful aggression; and
2) Imminent unlawful aggression. (People v. Nugas, supra.)
Actual or material unlawful aggression contemplates the offensive act of using physical force or weapon which positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. (Ganal, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 248130, December 02, 2020, Per Lazaro-Javier, J.)
Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. (People v. Nugas, supra.)
Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. (Ibid.)
People v. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011, Per Bersamin, J.:
• Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and then reached for his clutch bag on the dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun there. For one, as the CA pointed out, Nugas admitted not actually seeing if Glen had a gun in his clutch bag. And, secondly, the CA correctly found and declared Nugas’ testimony about Glen punching him to be improbable, viz:
It is also highly improbable that the victim, in relation to accused-[the Accused] Nugas position, can launch an attack against the latter. First, the victim was at the driver’s seat and seated between him were his wife and two children. Second, the victim was driving the Third, accused-[the Accused] Nugas was seated directly behind the victim. All things considered, it is highly improbable, nay risky for the victim’s family, for him to launch an attack.
• Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-defense because he had not been subjected to either actual or imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to prevent or to repel considering that Glen committed no unlawful aggression towards him.
• With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of self-defense, not having been established by Nugas, it is superfluous to still determine whether the remaining requisites of self-defense were attendant.
Element 2: Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression
The second requisite – reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression – requires a reasonable proportionality between the unlawful aggression and the defensive response: “[t]he means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.” This is a matter that depends on the circumstances. (Velasquez v. People, supra.)
a) Rational necessity or rational equivalence
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons that can easily be made in the calmness of reason. The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. In each particular case, it is necessary to judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in accordance with the rules of rational logic. The accused may be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether or not he employed rational means to repel the aggression. (Ganal, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 248130, December 02, 2020, Per Lazaro-Javier, J.)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury … As WE [the Supreme Court] stated in the case of People vs. Lara, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences. (Velasquez v. People, supra.)
People v. Olarbe, G.R. No. 227421, July 23, 2018, Per Bersamin, J.:
• In determining the reasonable necessity of the means employed, the courts may also look .at and consider the number of wounds inflicted. A large number of wounds inflicted on the victim can indicate a determined effort on the part of the accused to kill the victim and may belie the reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor. Here, however, although Arca sustained several wounds, the majority of the wounds were lacerations whose nature and extent were not explained. The lack of explanations has denied us the means to fairly adjudge the reasonableness of the means adopted by [the Accused] to prevent or repel Arca’s unlawful aggression. Accordingly, to rule out reasonable necessity of the means adopted by [the Accused] solely on the basis of the number of wounds would be unfair to him. In any event, we have to mention that the rule of reasonable necessity is not ironclad in its application, but is dependent upon the established circumstances of each particular case.
The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has neither the time nor the sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. For, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the actor not responsible in law for the consequences. Verily, the law requires rational equivalence, not material commensurability, viz.:
It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.
• Lastly, the absence of any showing that [the Accused] had provoked Arca, or that he had been induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive has been equally palpable. We deem to be established, therefore, that the third elements of the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of stranger were present.
Ganal, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 248130, December 02, 2020, Per Lazaro-Javier, J.:
Here, though [the Accused] inflicted five (5) bullet wounds and two (2) lacerations on Julwin, the number of wounds alone should not automatically lead to the conclusion that there was a determined effort on [the Accused]’s part to kill the victim. [the Accused] was overcome by the instinct of self-preservation on seeing that Julwin brashly entered into his property and even knocked his father unconscious for getting in the way. Julwin was determined to inflict injury on [the Accused] – he brought two (2) large stones and knife for the purpose.
Faced by a determined and prepared foe, [the Accused], who was simply drinking with his friends, suddenly found himself in a situation where he had to defend himself and his family from serious harm or even death. Notably, [the Accused] first tried to simply scare off Julwin by firing a warning shot. Julwin was unfazed and still continued to advance toward him with malevolent intent. And even after [the Accused] shot Julwin, the latter did not even falter but instead threatened to kill [the Accused] and his family. How does one react to such a terrifying situation? [the Accused] must have thought that his actions were so futile because Julwin was still standing there and shouting threats. [the Accused], at that instant, must have felt he had to end it once and for all – kill or be killed. So, he shot Julwin four (4) more times until the latter fell just a meter away from him. To repeat “the right of a person to take life in self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity for doing so; and his belief and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light of the circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill.”
Element 3: Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense
The third requisite – lack of sufficient provocation – requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching an assault. This also requires a consideration of proportionality. (Velasquez v. People, supra.)
Provocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense. (People v. Boholst-Cabellero, G.R. No. L-23249, November 25, 1974, Per Muñoz Palma, J.)
Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. (Belbis, Jr. v. Brucales, supra.)
People v. Boholst-Cabellero, G.R. No. L-23249, November 25, 1974, Per Muñoz Palma, J.:
• Here we have a woman who being strangled and choked by a furious aggressor and rendered almost unconscious by the strong pressure on her throat had no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon within her reach to save herself from impending death.
• Undoubtedly [the Accused] herein did not give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression or attack on her person by her husband, Francisco. While it was understandable for Francisco to be angry at his wife for finding her on the road in the middle of the night, however, he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment with an intent to kill by choking his wife’s throat. All that [the Accused] did was to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband, which is not a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense. Upon being confronted by her husband for being out late at night, accused gave a valid excuse that she went carolling with some friends to earn some money for their child. January 2 was indeed within the Christmas season during which by tradition people carol from house to house and receive monetary gifts in a Christian spirit of goodwill. The deceased therefore should have given some consideration to his wife’s excuse before jumping to conclusions and taking the extreme measure of attempting to kill his wife.
People v. Casas, G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015, G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015, Per Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
• [I]t was [the Accused] who was actually the aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly weapon, [the Accused] cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
• It bears clarification that the initial fistfight between Eligio and [the Accused] does not indicate that unlawful aggression was employed by the former against the latter considering that Eligio had already yielded from the brawl and, in fact, proceeded to flee. It is well-settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away – if and so such was the case with respect to Eligio – unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense, is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused.
Espinosa v. People, G.R. No. 181071, March 15, 2010, Per Perez, J.:
• [U]nlawful aggression on the part of private complainant Merto was manifested by his attack upon the person of the petitioner in throwing a stone at the latter. This sudden and unexpected assault posed actual danger on the life or limb of the petitioner, prompting the latter to take steps in his defense. To the mind of the Court, this is an offensive positively strong enough to be the basis for a defensive action.
3. Things to note
The following are some additional things to note about this offense.
a. Retaliation
Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. (Belbis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012, Per Peralta, J.)
Belbis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012, Per Peralta, J.:
• [T]he unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased when [the Accused] Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Although there was still some struggle involved between the victim and [the Accused] Rodolfo, there is no doubt that the latter, who was in possession of the same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused Such an aggression can also be surmised on the four stab wounds sustained by the victim on his back. It is hard to believe based on the location of the stab wounds, all at the back portion of the body (right lumbar area, left lumbar area, left buttock, medial aspect and left buttock, lateral aspect), that [the Accused] Rodolfo was defending himself. It would have been different if the wounds inflicted were located in the front portion of the victim’s body.
b. No accidental self-defense
There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law. (Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004, Per Callejo, Sr., J.)
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. (Ibid.)
On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent. The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. (Ibid.)
References
• Title I – Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability, Book I, Act No. 3815, Revised Penal Code
