Slander / Oral Defamation, A358 Revised Penal Code

Slander or oral defamation is libel via spoken words.

1. Concept

Slander or Oral Defamation – is “libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing.” It is defined as “the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.” (De Leon v. People, G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016, Per Mendoza J.)

a. Legal basis

Art. 358. Slander. – Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000). (As amended by R.A. 10951).

(Revised Penal Code)

2. Modes of commission

The following are the modes of committing the offense:

1) Simple Oral Defamation; or

2) Grave Oral Defamation – when it is of a serious and insulting nature. (REVISED PENALC ODE, Article 358; De Leon v. People, supra.)

a. Mode 1: Simple Oral Defamation

Elements of the offense of simple oral defamation:

1) There must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances;

2) Made orally;

3) Publicly;

4) And maliciously;

5) Directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;

6) Which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

1) Element 1: Imputation

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

[I]n Cruz v. Court of Appeals, petitioner and complainant, a Municipal Judge, were next door neighbors. Animosity grew between their two families because of some disputes. Petitioner resented the practice of complainant of throwing garbage and animal excrement into her premises. There was also a boundary dispute between petitioner’s mother and complainant, which was the subject of a civil suit for “Recovery of Possession, Ownership, Enforcement of Legal Easement and Abatement of Nuisance” filed by the mother before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against complainant. Additionally, petitioner’s mother had previously instituted an administrative complaint against the complainant before the Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed. There was a pent-up feeling of being aggrieved, resentment, anger, and vexation on petitioner’s part, culminating in her outburst against complainants. For having called the complainant judge “land grabber,” “shameless” and “hypocrite,” petitioner was charged and subsequently convicted by the Court of First Instance of three separate offenses of Grave Oral Defamation committed on 5, 6 and 8 August 1976. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdicts of conviction. On review, however, we held that although the abusive remarks may ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the environmental circumstances of the case, there having been provocation on complainant’s part, and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for the crime of Slight Oral Defamation… (Villanueva v. People, supra., citing Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-56224-26, November 25, 1982)

Pader v. People, G.R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000, Per Pardo, J.:

The accused shouted “putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!” at the gate of Atty. Escolangco, who was then having conversation with his political leaders at the terrace of his house. As Atty. Escolangco was running for Vice Mayor at that time, he was dumbfounded and embarrassed by such remark.]

• The issue is whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation. In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.

• Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The trial court, in arriving at its decision, considered that the defamation was deliberately done to destroy Atty. Escolango’s reputation since the parties were political opponents.

• We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioner’s anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioner’s father died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.

• … the expression “putang ina mo” is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk [R.] Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.

• In similar fashion, the trial court erred in awarding moral damages without proof of suffering. Accordingly, petitioner may be convicted only of slight oral defamation defined and penalized under Article 358, Revised Penal Code…

a) Words used, construed in entirety

To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used in the statement must be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

b) Insulting words, not actionable

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

c) “Yabang”

[I]n Jamilano v. Court of Appeals, where calling someone “yabang” (boastful or arrogant) was found not defamatory, the complainant’s subsequent recourse to the law on oral defamation was not sustained by the Court. (De Leon v. People, supra, citing Jamilano v. Court of Appeals, En Banc, G.R. No. L-26059, October 31, 1969)

d) Heat of anger

[I]t is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

2) Element 2: Made orally

To constitute slander or oral defamation, the defamatory remark should be done orally. Otherwise, if it was on writing, it would be covered be libel.

Agbayani v. CA, G.R. No. 183623, June 25, 2012, Per Reyes, J.:

• Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)…, working as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II, respectively. On December 29, 2006, Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation… for allegedly uttering against her, in the presence of their fellow court employees and while she was going about her usual duties at work, the following statements, to wit:

“ANG GALING MO LETY, SINABI MO NA TINAPOS MO YUNG MARVILLA CASE, ANG GALING MO. FEELING LAWYER KA KASI, BAKIT DI KA MAGDUTY NA LANG, STENOGRAPHER KA MAGSTENO KA NA LANG, ANG GALING MO, FEELING LAWYER KA TALAGA. NAGBEBENTA KA NG KASO, TIRADOR KA NG JUDGE. SIGE HIGH BLOOD DIN KA, MAMATAY KA SANA SA HIGH BLOOD MO.”

• We recall that in the morning of December 27, 2006 when the alleged utterances were made, Genabe was about to punch in her time in her card when she was informed that she had been suspended for failing to meet her deadline in a case, and that it was Agbayani who informed the presiding judge that she had missed her deadline when she left to attend a convention in Baguio City, leaving Agbayani to finish the task herself. According to Undersecretary Pineda, the confluence of these circumstances was the immediate cause of respondent Genabe’s emotional and psychological distress. We rule that his determination that the defamation was uttered while the respondent was in extreme excitement or in a state of passion and obfuscation, rendering her offense of lesser gravity than if it had been made with cold and calculating deliberation, is beyond the ambit of our review. The CA concurred that the complained utterances constituted only slight oral defamation, having been said in the heat of anger and with perceived provocation from Agbayani. Respondent Genabe was of a highly volatile personality prone to throw fits (sumpongs), who thus shared a hostile working environment with her co-employees, particularly with her superiors, Agbayani and Hon. [B.] Maceda, the Presiding Judge of Branch 275, whom she claimed had committed against her “grievous acts that outrage moral and social conduct.” That there had been a long-standing animosity between Agbayani and Genabe is not denied.

3). Element 3: Publicly

De Leon v. People, G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016, Per Mendoza, J.:

• Records show that De Leon was charged with Grave Oral Defamation in the Information filed… the accusatory portion of which reads:

That, on or about April 17, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with the deliberate intent to besmirch the honor and reputation of one SPO3 [P.L.] LEONARDO, did and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously publicly proffer against the latter slanderous words and expressions such as “WALANGHIYA KANG MANGONGOTONG NA PULIS KA, ANG YABANG YABANG MO NOON. PATAY KA SA AKIN MAMAYA [,]” and other words and expressions of similar import, thereby bringing the said SPO3 [P.L.] LEONARDO into public contempt, discredit and ridicule.

Contrary to law.

• [Version of the Prosecution] The first hearing was scheduled on April 17, 2006 at the PLEB office on the 5th Floor of the Manila City Hall; At around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, while waiting outside the PLEB office on the 5th floor of the Manila City Hall, [Complainant] noticed [Accused] and several of his companions approaching. Before entering the PLEB office, De Leon uttered these words to SPO3 Leonardo, “Walanghiya kang mangongotong na pulis ka, ang yabang yabang mo noon. Patay ka sa akin ngayon.”

• [Version of the Defense] [T]he defense claimed that there was a prior incident that took place on the morning of February 27, 2006 when De Leon, with his son John, while having breakfast with their fellow joggers at the Philippine National Railroad-Tutuban Station, were approached by SPO3 Leonardo who arrived on his scooter. With his gun drawn, SPO3 Leonardo walked fast towards the group and at a distance of two meters, more or less, he said, “Putang ina mo, tapos ka na Ricky Boy, referring to De Leon.” He pressed the trigger but the gun did not fire, when he was to strike again, De Leon was able to escape with the help of John… [Next par.] Consequently, De Leon and John filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo before the PLEB and the first hearing was set on April 17, 2006. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay sa Paghahabla filed before the PLEB, De Leon narrated that he and SPO3 Leonardo were former jogging buddies and that the latter wanted to borrow money from the former in the amount of P150,000.00, but he declined. SPO3 Leonardo became upset with him, culminating in the gun-pointing incident… [Next par.] On April 17, 2006, at around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, De Leon, in the company of his wife Concepcion, Manalo, Molera, and several others went to the PLEB office to attend the hearing. When De Leon and his companions arrived at the PLEB, they saw SPO3 Leonardo seated on the bench alone; that they were about to pass when SPO3 Leonardo stood up, badmouthed and threatened De Leon by uttering the words, “Putang-ina mong mayabang ka, pag di mo inurong demanda mo sa akin, papatayin kita.”

•  Considering the factual backdrop of this case, the Court is convinced that the crime committed by De Leon was only slight oral defamation for the following reasons:

• First, as to the relationship of the parties, they were obviously acquainted with each other as they were former jogging buddies. Prior to the purported gun-pointing incident, there was no reason for De Leon to harbor ill feelings towards SPO3 Leonardo.

• Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during the first hearing on the administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing incident. The gap between the gun-pointing incident and the first hearing was relatively short, a span of time within which the wounded feelings could not have been healed. The utterance made by De Leon was but a mere product of emotional outburst, kept inside his system and unleashed during their encounter.

• Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent to strike deep into the character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between the parties should have been considered. It was because of the purported gun-pointing incident that De Leon hurled those words. There was no intention to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo because De Leon’s utterance could simply be construed as his expression of dismay towards his actions as his friend and member of the community.

• The defamatory remarks were not in connection with the public officer’s duty

• Finally, the Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police officer by profession, his complaint against De Leon for oral defamation must still prosper. It has been held that a public officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticism. The doctrine, nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory statement was uttered in connection with the public officer’s duty…

4) Element 4: Maliciously

The imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances, should be done maliciously, as opposed to remarks which may have for their purpose as a joke or humor, which carry no malicious intent.

5) Element 5: Natural or juridical persons, or dead persons

The defamed person may be natural persons or juridical persons.

Natural persons refer to individuals or human beings, and they either be living or dead.

Juridical persons refer to artificial persons created by law, such as a corporation, partnership, association, and so on.

6) Element 6: Dishonour, discredit, or contempt

The imputation should tend to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the defamed person, such as casting doubt or suspicion on their honor or reputation.

a) Called gangster in the middle of a sermon

In the case of People v. Arcand, a priest called the offended party a gangster in the middle of the sermon. The Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander as there was no imputation of a crime, a vice or immorality. (De Leon v. People, supra, citing People v. Arcand, G.R. No. 46336, September 29, 1939)

b) “Putang nia mo”

In Pader v. People, the Court ruled that the crime committed was only slight oral defamation as it considered the expression, “putang ina mo,” as expression to convey anger or displeasure. Such utterance was found not seriously insulting considering that he was drunk when he uttered those words and his anger was instigated by what the private complainant did when the former’s father died. (De Leon v. People, supra, citing Pader v. People, G.R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000)

b. Mode 2: Grave Oral Defamation

Elements of the offense of grave oral defamation:

1) There must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances;

2) Made orally;

3) Publicly;

4) And maliciously;

5) Directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;

6) Which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.

7) Serious and insulting nature (REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 358; See De Leon v. People, supra.)

1) Element 1: Imputation

See earlier discussion.

2) Element 2: Made orally

See earlier discussion.

3) Element 3: Publicly

Seeearlier related discussion.

4) Element 4: Maliciously

Seeearlier related discussion.

5) Element 5: Natural or juridical persons, or dead persons

Seeearlier related discussion.

6) Element 6: Dishonour, discredit, or contempt

Seeearlier related discussion.

7) Element 7: Serious in nature

Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended party. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. (Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006, Per Chico-Nazario, J.)

a) Factors

The gravity depends upon:

1) the expressions used;

2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and

3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. (De Leon v. People, supra.)

b) Scurrilous epithets, imputing unchastity

In U.S. v. Tolosa, where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was grave slander. (De Leon v. People, supra, citing G.R. No. L-12696, November 19, 1917)

c) Imputed estafa

In Balite v. People, the accused was found guilty of grave oral defamation as the scurrilous words he imputed to the offended party constituted the crime of estafa. (De Leon v. People, supra, citing Balite v. People, En Banc, G.R. No. L-21475, September 30, 1966)

3. Things to note

The following are some additional things to note about this offense.

a. Social standing

[T]hat the social standing and position of the offended party are also taken into account and thus, it was held that the slander was grave, because the offended party had held previously the Office of Congressman, Governor, and Senator and was then a candidate for Vice-President, for which no amount of sophistry would take the statement out of the compass of grave oral defamation. (Villanueva v. People, supra.)

b. Extemporaneous over radio

Is it libel or oral defamation if a person shouted defamatory remarks through an amplifier system? This was the novel question posed in the case below.

People v. Santiago, En Banc, G.R. No. L-17663, May 30, 1962, Concepcion, J.:

• The information herein alleges that defendant Isauro Santiago has committed the crime of “libel” as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of October 1959, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, for the evident purpose of injuring the name and reputation of [A.H.] Lacson, and of impeaching and besmirching the latter’s virtue, honesty, honor and reputation, and with the malicious intent of exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, did then and there wilfully, feloniously, maliciously and publicly call said Mayor [A.H.] Lacson, in the course of a political speech delivered at 392 Fraternal, Quiapo, in said city, thru the medium of an amplifier system and before a crowd of around a hundred persons, the following, to wit: “Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in Shellborne Hotel”, which are false, malicious and highly defamatory statements against Mayor [A.H.] Lacson, delivered with no good intentions or justifiable motive, but solely for the purpose of injuring the name and reputation of said Mayor [A.H.] Lacson and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.

• Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is, not libel, but oral defamation, which has already prescribed…

• The prosecution maintains that “the medium of an amplifier system”, thru which the defamatory statements imputed to the accused were allegedly made, falls within the purview of the terms “writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means”, appearing in said Article 355, in the sense, at least, that in “amplifier system” is a means “similar” to “radio”.

• This pretense is untenable. To begin with, as correctly stated in defendant’s brief, “radio as a means of publication is ‘the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver” (Library of Universal Knowledge)’” (see, also, 18 Encyclopedia Britanica, p. 285), “while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system”, such as the one mentioned in the information, “is not thru ‘electromagnetic waves’ and is with the use of ‘conducting wires’ intervening between the transmitter… and the receiver…”

• Secondly, even the word “radio” used in said Article 355, should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated — “writing, printing, lithography, engraving… phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition or cinematographical exhibition” — all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation. Thus, it has been held that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel…, whereas the rules governing such offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon…

• IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation…

4. Distinguish from other offenses

This offense is distinguished from other offenses or crimes below.

a. Slander vs Slander by deed

Thus, slander is defamation via spoken words. On the other hand, slander by deed is defamation via conduct or behavior.

For more information, see: Slander by Deed

b. Slander vs Libel

Thus, slander is defamation via spoken words. On the other hand, libel is defamation via printed words.

For more information, see: Libel

4. In relation to other offenses

The offense has been related to these other offenses.

a. No crime of grave oral defamation in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610

If defamatory remarks were directed at minors, does this constitute child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610? If so, may this be related to oral defamation? This was the interesting question that was resolved in the following case.

Brinas v. People, G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021, Per Caguioa, J.:

• In gist, Briñas posits that she was improperly convicted of a crime which does not exist because grave oral defamation under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 are different and mutually exclusive offenses. Hence, convicting her for one in relation to the other was an error. She claims that she cannot be made liable for child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 because the same requires a specific criminal intent to degrade, debase or demean the intrinsic worth of a child as a human being which is lacking in the present case.

• Section 10(a) is clear in that it punishes acts of child abuse which are “not covered by the Revised Penal Code.” Hence, on this point, Briñas is correct — she cannot be convicted of grave oral defamation under the RPC in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610. From the plain language of Section 10(a), the acts punished under it and those punished under the RPC are mutually exclusive. Acts which are already covered by the RPC are excluded from the coverage of Section 10(a).

References

• Title XIII – Crimes Against Honor, Act No. 3815, Revised Penal Code

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/Updated: June 23, 2023